02600nam 2200613 a 450 991021964690332120200520144314.01-4623-3368-01-283-51398-697866138264351-4519-0724-9(CKB)2670000000079765(OCoLC)698585375(CaPaEBR)ebrary10450961(SSID)ssj0001076201(PQKBManifestationID)11670099(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001076201(PQKBWorkID)11027000(PQKB)10368780(MiAaPQ)EBC3014644(IMF)WPIEE2005169(EXLCZ)99267000000007976520130129d2005 uf 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrDeposit insurance regulatory forbearance and economic growth implications for the Japanese banking crisis /Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzer[Washington, D.C.] International Monetary Fund20051 online resource (34 p.) IMF working paper ;WP/05/169Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph1-4527-5016-5 1-4518-6188-5 Includes bibliographical references.An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation demonstrates how deposit insurance and prudential regulatory forbearance lead to banking crises and growth declines. The model assumptions are based on features of the Japanese financial system and regulation. The model demonstrates how banking and growth crises can evolve under perfect foresight. The dynamics for economic aggregates and asset prices predicted by the model are shown to be generally consistent with the experience of the Japanese economy and financial system through the 1990s. We also test our maintained hypothesis of rational expectations using asset price data for Japan over the 1980s and 1990s.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2005/169Deposit insuranceJapanFinancial crisesJapanBanks and bankingJapanDeposit insuranceFinancial crisesBanks and bankingDekle Robert956296Kletzer Kenneth119641IMF Institute.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910219646903321Deposit insurance regulatory forbearance and economic growth2251583UNINA