01888nam 22004453 450 991016335490332120250827080354.097817828982071782898204(CKB)3810000000098081(BIP)054487315(VLeBooks)9781782898207(Perlego)3018640(MiAaPQ)EBC32210786(Au-PeEL)EBL32210786(Exl-AI)993810000000098081(OCoLC)1534811617(EXLCZ)99381000000009808120250827d2014 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierBarbarossa1st ed.Waipu :Pickle Partners Publishing,2014.©2014.1 online resource (36 p.) The German planning process for the 1941 invasion of Soviet Russia is analyzed through the presentation of the major plans developed from July 1940 until June 1941. The final plan is then critiqued within the context of the applicable Principles of War. The planning process was characterized by significant disagreements between Hitler, the German High Command and the Army High Command. The major points of contention relate to the selection of primary objectives and force deployment patterns. A set of conclusions is presented which argues that the planning process was faulty due to a number of assumptions which were generally held by the officers who were involved in the process.Operational art (Military science)Generated by AIOperational art (Military science)Snively John D1434530MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910163354903321Barbarossa4425246UNINA