02486nam 22005053 450 991016332800332120250815080325.097817828958931782895892(CKB)3810000000097899(BIP)054487222(VLeBooks)9781782895893(Perlego)3020859(MiAaPQ)EBC32229948(Au-PeEL)EBL32229948(Exl-AI)993810000000097899(Exl-AI)32229948(OCoLC)1532833389(EXLCZ)99381000000009789920250815d2014 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierJackson and Mcclellan1st ed.Bielefeld :Pickle Partners Publishing,2014.©2014.1 online resource (50 p.) Title page -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ABSTRACT -- INTRODUCTION -- JACKSON: PRE-CIVIL WAR -- McCLELLAN: PRE-CIVIL WAR -- JACKSON: THE CIVIL WAR -- McCLELLAN:. THE CIVIL WAR -- ANALYSIS -- CONCLUSION -- IMPLICATIONS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- BOOKS -- PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES -- GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND MANUALSGenerated by AI.Central to the waging of war at the tactical level is the interplay between leadership and doctrine. Within a doctrinal context, the Army must develop leaders capable of winning the next war. This study examines the balance between leadership and doctrine and identifies the characteristics that distinguish the great leader from the also-ran.The vehicle for this examination is a comparison of two American Civil war generals, Stonewall Jackson and George McClellan. Purporting to support the same doctrine, the two men achieved remarkably dissimilar results on the battlefield. This analysis demonstrates that the reasons for that difference lay primarily in the realm of leadership rather than in the implementation of doctrine, and identifies the leadership principles key to success at the tactical level of war.Military doctrineGenerated by AIGeneralsUnited StatesGenerated by AIMilitary doctrineGenerals355.331Thomas Kent1377822MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910163328003321Jackson and Mcclellan4416936UNINA