04087nam 22004453 450 991016332610332120230803215325.097817828970711782897070(CKB)3810000000097998(MiAaPQ)EBC5626016(Au-PeEL)EBL5626016(CaPaEBR)ebr11642264(OCoLC)1080999955(Perlego)3021995(EXLCZ)99381000000009799820210901d2014 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierAirpower Employment Of The Fifth Air Force In The World War II Southwest Pacific Theater1st ed.Chicago :Verdun Press,2014.©2014.1 online resource (42 pages)Intro -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ABSTRACT -- CHAPTER 1 - PRE-WORLD WAR II AIR DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENTS -- World War I Developments -- Political Post-War Environment -- Air Corps Tactical School -- Air Corps Staff -- War Department General Staff -- Air War Plans Division -- CHAPTER 2 - GENERAL KENNEY'S QUALIFICATIONS -- Breadth of Career Experience -- Kenney's Philosophy on Air Warfare -- CHAPTER 3 - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER -- Overview Prior to General Kenney Taking Command -- General Kenney Assumes Command -- CHAPTER 4 - EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRPOWER IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC -- Roles and Impact of the Fifth Air Force -- MacArthur and Arnold Views on Kenney -- Japanese Weaknesses -- CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS -- Lack of US Pre-war Air Doctrine -- Final Remarks -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- Primary Sources -- Secondary Sources.This research project studies the employment of airpower by the Fifth Air Force, under Gen George C. Kenney, in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II. The research began with two basic assumptions. First, it assumed that the strategic bombardment theory developed by the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s was the definitive doctrine of the Air Corps upon entry into World War II. Second, it assumed that General Kenney and his staff were required to develop a new doctrine for airpower employment since the situation in the Southwest Pacific did not lend itself to strategic bombardment of the Japanese industrial web. The research process proved both of these assumptions invalid. Study of historical records, personal accounts, and subsequent historical writings in several areas revealed that there was no clear and consistent doctrine for the employment of airpower... General Kenney assumed command of the Fifth Air Force with a clear vision of how to employ air forces to defeat the enemy. His diverse background gave him a balanced view of the roles airpower should play, and he was not convinced by the strategic bombardment theory that claimed invincibility for the bomber. His World War I experiences and teachings at the Air Corps Tactical School provided a strong belief in the importance of air superiority and attack aviation. He was innovative in modifying tactics and equipment, and in developing new roles for airpower as the situation dictated... This study surveys the development of airpower doctrine beginning with World War followed by major developments during the interwar period in several arenas. It then looks at the varied aspects of Gen George C. Kenney's career which prepared him to command the Fifth Air Force in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II. Finally, it considers General Kenney's employment of airpower in light of the pre-war doctrine development. United States. Army Air Forces. Air Force, 5thUnited States. Army Air Forces. Air Force, 5th.940.54497300000003Barr Major James A1376459MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910163326103321Airpower Employment Of The Fifth Air Force In The World War II Southwest Pacific Theater3412279UNINA