00975nam0 22002651i 450 UON0034410620231205104310.73320091109d1967 |0itac50 bagerAT|||| 1||||Aufstand der SalzknechteFritz HabeckWienMünchenVerlag für Jugend und Volk1967195 p.21 cm.DEMünchenUONL003025ATWienUONL003140833.91Narrativa tedesca, 1900-199021HABECKFritzUONV192721189164Verlag für Jugend und VolkUONV276744650ITSOL20240220RICASIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEOUONSIUON00344106SIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEOSI TED 26 I HAB SI LO 23268 5 Aufstand der Salzknechte1360524UNIOR03812nam 22004933 450 991016319210332120250730080351.097817828958311782895833(CKB)3810000000097894(BIP)058039312(VLeBooks)9781782895831(Perlego)3020715(MiAaPQ)EBC32216131(Au-PeEL)EBL32216131(OCoLC)1530381240(Exl-AI)993810000000097894(Exl-AI)32216131(EXLCZ)99381000000009789420250730d2014 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierIt Was Sheridan's Fault Not Custer's And the Ties to Current Planning1st ed.Waipu :Pickle Partners Publishing,2014.©2014.1 online resource (71 p.) Title page -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Literature Review -- Indian Campaign Literature -- Analytical Framework -- Summary of Literature Review -- Methodology -- 1868-1869 Cheyenne War -- Strategic Context -- Analysis of Elements of Operational Art -- COIN Analysis -- 1874-1875 Red River War -- Strategic Context -- Analysis of Elements of Operational Art -- COIN Analysis -- 1876 Centennial Campaign -- Strategic Context -- Analysis of Elements of Operational Art -- COIN Analysis -- 1876-1877 Sioux Campaign -- Strategic Context -- Analysis of Elements of Operational Art -- COIN Analysis -- Summary and Conclusion -- Summary -- Conclusion -- APPENDIX A (Terms) -- APPENDIX B (Elements of Operational Art)Generated by AI.Martin van Creveld, a noted theorist, contends that the concept of operational art did not take off in the U.S. until after the Vietnam War. Conversely, James Schneider, a prominent military theorist, asserts that operational art began in the American Civil War. This monograph provides a holistic analysis of four Plains Indian War Campaigns. Lieutenant General (LTG) Philip Sheridan conducted all four campaigns. This analysis illustrates several enduring principles of both operational art and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The purpose of the monograph is to explain the initial failure of LTG Sheridan's 1876 Centennial Campaign against the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians. Additionally, this explanation relates the significance of LTG Sheridan's planning to contemporary COIN campaign planning. The overall methodology is the incorporation of four case studies to test the theory of sanctuary control and elimination of resources to defeat insurgencies.The monograph contains three key findings. The first key finding is that the failure at the Little Big Horn was LTG Sheridan's fault not LTC Custer's, and this directly relates to the second finding. The second key finding is the importance of operational art in designing a campaign plan to link tactical actions to strategic objectives. The third finding is the efficacy of some of the current COIN tenets...Ultimately, this monograph demonstrates the utility of a strategy of exhaustion and its resulting operations to control terrain and insurgent sanctuaries as well as to deny the enemy resources to defeat an insurgency.Operational art (Military science)Generated by AICounterinsurgencyUnited StatesGenerated by AIOperational art (Military science)CounterinsurgencyStephens Hubert L1835059MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910163192103321It Was Sheridan's Fault Not Custer's4410749UNINA