01472nam 2200361 n 450 99639483820331620221108100838.0(CKB)4940000000123331(EEBO)2240939384(UnM)99122381500971(EXLCZ)99494000000012333119900910d1628 uh engurbn||||a|bb|By the King. A proclamation for the repressing of disorders of marriners[electronic resource]Imprinted at London By Bonham Norton, and Iohn Bill, printers to the Kings most excellent MaiestieM.DC.XXVII. [1627, i.e. 1628]1 sheet ([1] p.)Dated at end: ... White-Hall, the seuenteenth day of February in the third yeere of our reigne ... .The publication year is given according to Lady Day dating.Arms 21; Steele notation: not Priuie and.Reproduction of original in the British Library.eebo-0018Great BritainHistory, NavalStuarts, 1603-1714Early works to 1800Great BritainHistoryCharles I, 1625-1649Early works to 1800CharlesKing of England,1600-1649.793295Cu-RivESCu-RivESCStRLINCu-RivESBOOK996394838203316By the King. A proclamation for the repressing of disorders of marriners2391207UNISA04668oam 22011534 450 991016292560332120250426110502.09781475569926147556992097814755699401475569947(CKB)3710000001045048(MiAaPQ)EBC4800308(IMF)WPIEA2017005WPIEA2017005(EXLCZ)99371000000104504820020129d2017 uf 0engurcnu||||||||rdacontentrdamediardacarrierOn the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance : An Empirical Analysis of Spain’s Regions /Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor Lledo, Javier PérezWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2017.1 online resource (34 pages) illustrations, tablesIMF Working Papers9781475569841 147556984X Includes bibliographical references.This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2017/005EconomicsEconomicsSpainBudgetingimfMacroeconomicsimfPublic FinanceimfNational BudgetimfBudget SystemsimfForecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and DebtimfState and Local Budget and ExpendituresimfIntergovernmental RelationsimfFederalismimfSecessionimfFiscal PolicyimfDebtimfDebt ManagementimfSovereign DebtimfPublic AdministrationimfPublic Sector Accounting and AuditsimfPublic finance & taxationimfBudgeting & financial managementimfGovernment debt managementimfFiscal rulesimfBudget planning and preparationimfFiscal consolidationimfFiscal risksimfPublic financial management (PFM)imfFiscal policyimfDebts, PublicimfBudgetimfSpainimfEconomics.EconomicsBudgetingMacroeconomicsPublic FinanceNational BudgetBudget SystemsForecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and DebtState and Local Budget and ExpendituresIntergovernmental RelationsFederalismSecessionFiscal PolicyDebtDebt ManagementSovereign DebtPublic AdministrationPublic Sector Accounting and AuditsPublic finance & taxationBudgeting & financial managementGovernment debt managementFiscal rulesBudget planning and preparationFiscal consolidationFiscal risksPublic financial management (PFM)Fiscal policyDebts, PublicBudget330Delgado-Téllez Mar1378740Lledo Victor495905Pérez Javier422393DcWaIMFBOOK9910162925603321On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance3650696UNINA