10419nam 2200613 450 991015020650332120230803030037.00-273-77042-X(CKB)2670000000357965(SSID)ssj0000877064(PQKBManifestationID)12419982(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000877064(PQKBWorkID)10906010(PQKB)11487399(MiAaPQ)EBC5138300(Au-PeEL)EBL5138300(CaONFJC)MIL485117(OCoLC)1015865433(EXLCZ)99267000000035796520180104h20132013 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtccrIndustrial organization competition, strategy and policy /John Lipczynski, John O.S. Wilson and John GoddardFourth edition.Harlow, England :Pearson,2013.©20131 online resource (840 pages) color illustrations, chartsAlways LearningBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-273-77041-1 Includes bibliographical references and index.Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Part 1 Theoretical Foundations -- 1 Industrial organization: an introduction -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Static and dynamic views of competition -- 1.3 The structure-conduct-performance paradigm -- 1.4 Strategic management: a short diversion -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 2 Production, costs, demand and profit maximization -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Production and costs -- 2.3 Demand, revenue, elasticity and profit maximization -- 2.4 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 3 The neoclassical theory of the firm -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The neoclassical theory of the firm: historical development -- 3.3 Theories of perfect competition and monopoly -- 3.4 Efficiency and welfare properties of perfect competition and monopoly -- 3.5 Theory of monopolistic competition -- 3.6 Summary -- Discussion questions -- 4 Managerial and behavioural theories of the firm -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Critique of the neoclassical theory of the firm -- 4.3 Separation of ownership from control: managerial theories of the firm -- 4.4 The behavioural theory of the firm -- 4.5 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 5 Transaction costs, agency and resource-based theories of the firm -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Coasian firm -- 5.3 Transaction costs and the theory of the firm -- 5.4 Agency theory -- 5.5 Property rights and the theory of the firm -- 5.6 The resource-based theory of the firm -- 5.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 6 Corporate governance -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Agency problems and the need for corporate governance -- 6.3 Instruments of corporate governance -- 6.4 Corporate governance codes of practice -- 6.5 Corporate governance: implementation and empirical evidence -- 6.6 Business ethics -- 6.7 Corporate social responsibility.6.8 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- Part II: Structural Analysis of Industry -- 7 Oligopoly: non-collusive models -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Interdependence, conjectural variation, independent action and collusion -- 7.3 Models of output determination in duopoly -- 7.4 Models of price determination in duopoly -- 7.5 The kinked demand curve and models of price leadership -- 7.6 Game theory -- 7.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 8 Oligopoly: collusive models -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Collusive action and collusive forms -- 8.3 Collusive institutions -- 8.4 Profit-maximizing models of price and output determination for a cartel -- 8.5 Other motives for collusion -- 8.6 Factors conducive to cartel formation -- 8.7 Influences on cartel stability -- 8.8 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 9 Concentration: measurement and trends -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Market and industry definition -- 9.3 Official schemes for industry classification -- 9.4 Measures of seller concentration -- 9.5 Interpretation of concentration measures -- 9.6 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 10 Determinants of seller concentration -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Seller concentration: systematic determinants -- 10.3 The random growth hypothesis -- 10.4 Trends in concentration and the location of industry -- 10.5 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 11 Barriers to entry -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Types of barrier to entry -- 11.3 Entry-deterring strategies -- 11.4 Signalling commitment -- 11.5 Potential entry and contestability -- 11.6 Entry and industry evolution -- 11.7 Empirical evidence on entry -- 11.8 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 12 Market structure, firm strategy and performance -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Empirical tests of the SCP paradigm.12.3 Strategic groups -- 12.4 Sources of variation in profitability: industry, corporate and business unit effects -- 12.5 The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) -- 12.6 The persistence of profit -- 12.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- Part III: Analysis of Firm Strategy -- 13 Pricing -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Cost plus pricing -- 13.3 Price discrimination -- 13.4 Peak-load pricing -- 13.5 Transfer pricing -- 13.6 Price dispersion -- 13.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 14 Auctions -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Auction formats and models of bidders' valuations -- 14.3 The pure common value model and the winner's curse -- 14.4 Optimal bidding strategies and revenue equivalence in the independent private values model -- 14.5 Extensions and additional topics in auction theory -- 14.6 Empirical evidence -- 14.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 15 Product differentiation -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Types of product differentiation -- 15.3 Monopolistic competition revisited: the socially optimal amount of product differentiation -- 15.4 Lancaster's product characteristics model -- 15.5 Hotelling's location model -- 15.6 Salop's location model -- 15.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 16 Advertising -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Determinants of advertising expenditure -- 16.3 Advertising and product characteristics -- 16.4 Advertising and profit maximization -- 16.5 Advertising as a barrier to entry -- 16.6 Advertising, information search and quality signalling -- 16.7 Is there too much advertising? -- 16.8 Empirical evidence -- 16.9 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 17 Research and development -- 17.1 Introduction -- 17.2 Market structure, firm size and the pace of technological change -- 17.3 Investment in research and development.17.4 Diffusion -- 17.5 Patents -- 17.6 Empirical evidence -- 17.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 18 Horizontal mergers and strategic alliances -- 18.1 Introduction -- 18.2 Profit-maximizing motives for horizontal mergers -- 18.3 Non-profit-maximizing motives for horizontal mergers -- 18.4 Merger waves -- 18.5 Strategic alliances -- 18.6 Horizontal mergers: some empirical evidence -- 18.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 19 Vertical integration -- 19.1 Introduction -- 19.2 Motives for vertical integration: enhancement of market power -- 19.3 Motives for vertical integration: cost savings -- 19.4 Vertical disintegration -- 19.5 Empirical evidence on vertical integration -- 19.6 Agency and vertical relationships -- 19.7 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 20 Vertical restraints -- 20.1 Introduction -- 20.2 Motives for vertical restraints -- 20.3 Forms of vertical restraint -- 20.4 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 21 Network goods and services -- 21.1 Introduction -- 21.2 Demand for a network product or service -- 21.3 Market equilibrium price and quantity for a network good or service: perfect competition and monopoly -- 21.4 Market equilibrium price and quantity for a network good or service: duopoly -- 21.5 Forms of competition over standardization and compatibility -- 21.6 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 22 Diversification -- 22.1 Introduction -- 22.2 Types of diversification -- 22.3 Motives for diversification -- 22.4 Corporate focus and deconglomeration -- 22.5 Empirical evidence -- 22.6 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- Part IV: Analysis of Public Policy -- 23 Competition policy -- 23.1 Introduction -- 23.2 Competition policy: theoretical framework -- 23.3 Elements of competition policy.23.4 Implementation of competition policy -- 23.5 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- 24 Regulation -- 24.1 Introduction -- 24.2 The problem of natural monopoly -- 24.3 Nationalization -- 24.4 Privatization -- 24.5 Forms of regulation -- 24.6 Regulation of UK privatized industries -- 24.7 Regulation of the banking industry -- 24.8 Evaluation of regulation and deregulation -- 24.9 Franchising and competitive tendering -- 24.10 Summary -- Discussion questions -- Further reading -- APPENDICES: Analytical Tools -- APPENDIX 1: Mathematical methods -- APPENDIX 2: Econometric methods -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index.The fourth edition of Industrial Organisation continues to highlight the strong link between the theory and analysis of industrial economics using engaging case studies. It takes students on a journey through the historical development of industrial organisation to the present day with new case studies exploring contemporary issues in business, finance and economics such as: Corporate governance Executive pay Price Wars Cloud computing Barriers to entry in banking Patent infringement Social networking Mergers in the car industry Outsourcing &nbsp.Always learning.Industrial organization (Economic theory)Industrial organization (Economic theory)338.6Lipczynski John474966Wilson John O. S.Goddard John A.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910150206503321Industrial organization2878975UNINA