00836nam0-22003011i-450-990001457690403321200010103-7682-1110-X000145769FED01000145769(Aleph)000145769FED0100014576920000920d1977----km-y0itay50------baenga---a---001yy<<The >>Conducting Tissues of Bryophytesby Charles HebantVaduzGantner Verlag KG1977xi, 157 p.tav.26 cmwith 348 figures on 80 platesBriofiteHebant,Charles63932ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK99000145769040332113 IV 918811DBVDBVConducting Tissues of Bryophytes379762UNINA03752nam 22005535 450 991039085900332120220301231424.03-030-40216-910.1007/978-3-030-40216-7(CKB)4100000010770843(MiAaPQ)EBC6142818(DE-He213)978-3-030-40216-7(EXLCZ)99410000001077084320200320d2020 u| 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierGetting to Know the World Scientifically An Objective View /by Paul Needham1st ed. 2020.Cham :Springer International Publishing :Imprint: Springer,2020.1 online resource (x, 176 pages)Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,0166-6991 ;4233-030-40215-0 Preface -- PART I: Knowledge, Objectivity and Values. Chapter 1. Knowledge -- Chapter 2. Objectivity -- Chapter 3. Relativism -- Chapter 4. The Use and Abuse of Science -- PART II: Philosophies of Science. Chapter 5. Popper: Proving the Worth of Hypotheses -- Chapter 6. Duhem’s Continuity Thesis -- Chapter 7. Realism and the Advancement of Knowledge -- Bibliography -- Index.This undergraduate textbook introduces some fundamental issues in philosophy of science for students of philosophy and science students. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with knowledge and values. Chap. 1 presents the classical conception of knowledge as initiated by the ancient Greeks and elaborated during the development of science, introducing the central concepts of truth, belief and justification. Aspects of the quest for objectivity are taken up in the following two chapters. Moral issues are broached in Chap. 4, which discusses some aspects of the use and abuse of science, taking up the responsibilities of scientists in properly conducting their business and decision-makers in their concerns with the import of science for society. Part 2 contrasts the view of scientific progress as the rejecting of old hypotheses and theories and replacing them with new ones, represented by Karl Popper, with the conception of progress as accumulating knowledge, saving as much as possible from older theories, represented by Pierre Duhem. A concluding chapter defends the natural attitude of taking the theories of modern science to be literally true, i.e. realism, in the face of arguments drawn partly from the history of scientific progress in criticism of this stance.Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,0166-6991 ;423Philosophy and scienceHistoryPhysicsPhilosophy of Sciencehttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E34000History of Sciencehttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/731000History and Philosophical Foundations of Physicshttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/P29000Philosophy and science.History.Physics.Philosophy of Science.History of Science.History and Philosophical Foundations of Physics.501Needham Paulauthttp://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut352359MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910390859003321Getting to Know the World Scientifically2212233UNINA04027nam 2200649 a 450 991021999140332120240410072745.00-8330-3238-0(CKB)111056486374742(OCoLC)50763967(CaPaEBR)ebrary10505602(SSID)ssj0000128627(PQKBManifestationID)11991871(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128627(PQKBWorkID)10069059(PQKB)10827901(Au-PeEL)EBL227864(CaPaEBR)ebr10505602(OCoLC)123109585(MiAaPQ)EBC227864(oapen)doab114496(EXLCZ)9911105648637474220010514h20012001 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did /Stephen T. Hosmer1st ed.RAND Corporation2001Santa Monica, Calif. :Rand,2001.©20011 online resource (xxxi, 155 pages) illustrations, chartsProject Air Force series on Operation Allied Force"Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited."0-8330-3003-5 0-585-42538-8 Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-155).Introduction He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected He probably also worried about threat of future invasion He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover Concluding observationsThis report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operationsProject Air Force series on Operation Allied Force.Why Milosevic decided to settle when he didKosovo War, 1998-1999Kosovo War, 1998-1999Kosovo War, 1998-1999.Kosovo War, 1998-1999.949.7103Hosmer Stephen T910140United States.Air Force.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910219991403321The conflict over Kosovo2037070UNINA