01365nam2 2200265 i 450 VAN005658820150611114040.6320061127d1907 |0itac50 baitaIT|||| |||||ˆ2: ‰Effetti delle obbligazionirisarcimento del danno per inadempimento, rischio e pericolo, provvedimenti coercitivi, provvedimenti conservativi, azione surrogatoria, azione revocatoriua, gius di ritenzione, effetti delle obbligazioni connesse.Giorgio Giorgi7. edFirenzeF.lli Cammelli1907XII, 625 p.24 cm.001VAN00565612001 Teoria delle obbligazioni nel diritto moderno italianoesposta con la scorta della dottrina e della giurisprudenza dall'avv. Giorgio Giorgi210 FirenzeEugenio e Filippo Cammelli215 volumi24 cm.2FirenzeVANL000014GiorgiGiorgio1836-1915VANV079501227678CammelliVANV110639650ITSOL20230616RICABIBLIOTECA DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI GIURISPRUDENZAIT-CE0105VAN00VAN0056588BIBLIOTECA DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI GIURISPRUDENZA00CONS XV.Eh.114 (2) 00 798445638 20061127 Effetti delle obbligazioni1405226UNICAMPANIA04832oam 22012614 450 991015520220332120250426110938.09781475554007147555400197814755540521475554052(CKB)3710000000973903(MiAaPQ)EBC4771894(IMF)WPIEA2016221WPIEA2016221(EXLCZ)99371000000097390320020129d2016 uf 0engurcnu||||||||rdacontentrdamediardacarrierSecuritization and Credit Quality /David Marques-IbanezWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2016.1 online resource (42 pages) illustrationsIMF Working Papers9781475553765 1475553765 Includes bibliographical references.Banks are usually better informed on the loans they originate than other financial intermediaries. As a result, securitized loans might be of lower credit quality than otherwise similar nonsecuritized loans. We assess the effect of securitization activity on loans’ relative credit quality employing a uniquely detailed dataset from the euro-denominated syndicated loan market. We find that, at issuance, banks do not seem to select and securitize loans of lower credit quality. Following securitization, however, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates by more than those in the control group. We find tentative evidence suggesting that poorer performance by securitized loans might be linked to banks’ reduced monitoring incentives.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2016/221Asset-backed financingSyndicated loansCredit ratingsBanks and BankingimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfInvestments: GeneralimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfIndustries: Financial ServicesimfExports and ImportsimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfFinancial CrisesimfInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsimfFinanceimfInvestment & securitiesimfMonetary economicsimfBankingimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfInternational economicsimfLoansimfSecuritizationimfCreditimfFinancial crisesimfFinancial institutionsimfFinancial servicesimfMoneyimfDebt defaultimfExternal debtimfAsset-backed financingimfBanks and bankingimfDebts, ExternalimfUnited StatesimfAsset-backed financing.Syndicated loans.Credit ratings.Banks and BankingFinancial Risk ManagementInvestments: GeneralMoney and Monetary PolicyIndustries: Financial ServicesExports and ImportsBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralFinancial CrisesInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsFinanceInvestment & securitiesMonetary economicsBankingEconomic & financial crises & disastersInternational economicsLoansSecuritizationCreditFinancial crisesFinancial institutionsFinancial servicesMoneyDebt defaultExternal debtAsset-backed financingBanks and bankingDebts, ExternalMarques-Ibanez David1378322DcWaIMFBOOK9910155202203321Securitization and credit quality3416618UNINA