Creatività e linguaggio nella prescuola e a scuola : alla ricerca del significato / Fatima Marini Mariucci

• Record Nr.: UNISALENTO991000587879707536
• Autore: Marini Mariucci, Fatima
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Roma : A. Armando, [1976]
• Descrizione fisica: 183 p. ; 22 cm
• Collana: Serie di linguistica teorica e applicata
• Disciplina: 155.4
• Soggetti: Linguaggio infantile
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Italiano
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia

Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries : : Theory and Evidence / / Claudio Paiva, Rodrigo Moita

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910788524903321
• Autore: Paiva Claudio
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
• ISBN: 1-4623-0136-3; 1-4527-5820-4; 1-282-44831-5; 9786613821508; 1-4519-0973-X
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (24 p.)
• Collana: IMF Working Papers
• Altri autori (Persone): MoitaRodrigo
• Soggetti: Prices - Government policy; Price regulation; Investments: Energy; Inflation; Macroeconomics; Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices; Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data); Price Level; Deflation; Energy: General; Economic growth; Investment & securities; Fuel prices; Oil prices; Business cycles; Gasoline; Gas industry; United States
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: "November 2006."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. BACKGROUND""; ""III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY""; ""IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE""; ""V. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work""; ""REFERENCES""
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry may fall in periods immediately preceding an election. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical model. Using quarterly data from 32 industrial and developing countries over 1978-2004, we find strong statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets.