1.

Record Nr.

UNISALENTO991000587879707536

Autore

Marini Mariucci, Fatima

Titolo

Creatività e linguaggio nella prescuola e a scuola : alla ricerca del significato / Fatima Marini Mariucci

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Roma : A. Armando, [1976]

Descrizione fisica

183 p. ; 22 cm

Collana

Serie di linguistica teorica e applicata

Disciplina

155.4

Soggetti

Linguaggio infantile

Lingua di pubblicazione

Italiano

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910788524903321

Autore

Paiva Claudio

Titolo

Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries : : Theory and Evidence / / Claudio Paiva, Rodrigo Moita

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006

ISBN

1-4623-0136-3

1-4527-5820-4

1-282-44831-5

9786613821508

1-4519-0973-X

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (24 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

MoitaRodrigo

Soggetti

Prices - Government policy

Price regulation

Investments: Energy

Inflation

Macroeconomics

Energy: Demand and Supply

Prices

Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)

Price Level



Deflation

Energy: General

Economic growth

Investment & securities

Fuel prices

Oil prices

Business cycles

Gasoline

Gas industry

United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"November 2006."

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. BACKGROUND""; ""III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY""; ""IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE""; ""V. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work""; ""REFERENCES""

Sommario/riassunto

This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry may fall in periods immediately preceding an election. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical model. Using quarterly data from 32 industrial and developing countries over 1978-2004, we find strong statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets.