1.

Record Nr.

UNISA996466445903316

Titolo

Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017 [[electronic resource] ] : 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part II / / edited by Tsuyoshi Takagi, Thomas Peyrin

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2017

ISBN

3-319-70697-7

Edizione

[1st ed. 2017.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (XIX, 701 p. 98 illus.)

Collana

Security and Cryptology ; ; 10625

Disciplina

005.82

Soggetti

Data encryption (Computer science)

Computer security

Coding theory

Information theory

Management information systems

Computer science

Computers

Computer science—Mathematics

Cryptology

Systems and Data Security

Coding and Information Theory

Management of Computing and Information Systems

Theory of Computation

Mathematics of Computing

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di contenuto

Pairing-based Protocols -- Quantum Algorithms -- Elliptic Curves -- Block Chains -- Multi-Party Protocols.-Operating Modes Security Proofs.

Sommario/riassunto

The three-volume set LNCS 10624, 10625, 10626 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security,



ASIACRYPT 2017, held in Hong Kong, China, in December 2017. The 65 revised full papers  were carefully selected from 243 submissions. They are organized in topical sections on Post-Quantum Cryptography; Symmetric Key Cryptanalysis; Lattices; Homomorphic Encryptions; Access Control; Oblivious Protocols; Side Channel Analysis; Pairing-based Protocols; Quantum Algorithms; Elliptic Curves; Block Chains; Multi-Party Protocols; Operating Modes Security Proofs; Cryptographic Protocols; Foundations; Zero-Knowledge Proofs; and Symmetric Key Designs.

2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910788903903321

Autore

Kolb Robert W. <1949->

Titolo

Too much is not enough : incentives in executive compensation / / Robert W. Kolb

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Oxford, England : , : Oxford University Press, , 2012

©2012

ISBN

0-19-997712-7

0-19-025849-7

0-19-982959-4

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (225 p.)

Collana

Financial Management Association survey and synthesis series

Disciplina

331.2/164

Soggetti

Executives - Salaries, etc - United States

Incentives in industry - United States

Incentive awards - United States

Corporate governance - United States

Executives - Salaries, etc - Government policy - United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; 1. The Magnitude and Structure of Executive Compensation; The Magnitude of CEO Compensation; The Structure of Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses and Long-Term Incentive Plans; Restricted Stock Awards; Executive Stock Option (ESO) Awards; Other



Forms of Compensation; 2. Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment; Corporate Governance, Incentive Alignment, and the Managerial Power Hypothesis; The Levers of Managerial Power

Limits to Pay in the Managerial Power HypothesisAssessing the Conceptual Conflict Between the Agency-Theoretic and Managerial Power Views of Executive Compensation; What About Ethics, Duty, and Justice?; Fiduciary Duty; Executive Compensation and Distributive Justice; 3. The Incentive Structure of Executive Compensation; The Incentive Revolution and Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses; Restricted Stock and Performance Shares; Executive Stock Options; Equity Compensation: Retaining the Employees You Have and Attracting the Ones You Want

Different Instruments as Tools of Incentive Compensation4. Executive Stock Options and the Incentives They Create; ESO Incentives, Firm Practices, and the Effect of Accounting Rules; Option Pricing Models; Option Valuation Effects of Individual Option Parameters; The Option Pricing Model and Incentives; Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; What Exercise Price?; Repricing and Reloading Executive Stock Options; The CEO's Utility and the Desire for ESOs; 5. Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; CEO Wealth, Pay, and Performance; Exercise of ESOs

Unwinding Incentives6. Executive Incentives and Risk Taking; Equity Compensation and the CEO's Risk Appetite; Executive Compensation and the Risk-Taking Behavior of CEOs; Incentive Compensation, Risk Taking, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009; 7. Incentive Compensation and the Management of the Firm; Incentive Compensation and the Firm's Investment Program; CEO Incentives and the Firm's Financing Decisions; Compensation Incentives, Dividends, and Share Repurchases; Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions, and Liquidations; Compensation Incentives and Corporate Risk Management

Compensation Incentives and Corporate Disclosures8. Perverse Incentive Effects: Executives Behaving Badly; Earnings Management; Option Games and Exploitation; Option Games: A Warning About Incentives in Executive Compensation; 9. Incentives in Executive Compensation: A Final Assessment; Incentive Compensation and the Level of Executive Pay; New Legislation and the Shaping of Incentives; How Dysfunctional Is Executive Pay?; On Balance, Is Incentive Compensation Beneficial?; To Improve Executive Compensation, Improve Corporate Governance

Executive Pay, Continuing Inequality, and the Question of Justice

Sommario/riassunto

The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in t