By the governour and company of Massachusetts Bay in New-England at a general court held at Boston, on adjournment, Feb. 16th 1685 [[electronic resource]]

• Record Nr.: UNISA996394502503316
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: [Boston, : Printed by John Foster, 1686]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 broadside
• Soggetti: Massachusetts History Colonial period, ca. 1600-1775
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Appointing March 25th as a day of solemn humiliation and prayer.; Imprint suggested by Wing.; Imperfect: stained, with slight loss of print.; Reproduction of original in the Harvard University Library.
• Sommario/riassunto: eebo-0062

Security of biochip cyberphysical systems / / Shayan Mohammed [and four others]

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910556895903321
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022]; ©2022
• ISBN: 3-030-93274-5
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (135 pages) : illustrations
• Disciplina: 610.28
• Soggetti: Biochips - Testing; Cooperating objects (Computer systems) - Automatic control
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Acknowledgment -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Threat to Integrity -- 1.2 The Threat to IP Rights -- 1.3 Book's Scope and Road Map -- 1.4 Biochip Systems -- 1.4.1 Digital Microfluidic Biochips -- 1.4.2 Continuous-Flow Microfluidic Biochips -- 1.4.3 Biochip Cyber-Physical System -- 1.5 Related Work -- 1.5.1 Attacks -- 1.5.2 Defenses: Tampering -- 1.5.3 Defenses: IP Theft -- 2 Threat Landscape -- 2.1 Online Tampering -- 2.1.1 Case Study: Immunoassay -- 2.1.1.1 Parameter Tampering -- 2.1.1.2 Contamination -- 2.1.1.3 Miscalibration -- 2.2 Fabrication Tampering -- 2.2.1 Case Study: Microfluidic Trojan -- 2.2.1.1 Design of a Multi-Height Valve -- 2.2.1.2 Draining of Valve Pressure -- 2.2.1.3 Attack Model -- 2.3 Reverse-Engineering -- 2.3.1 Case Study: Bioassay Theft -- 3 Architecture for Security -- 3.1 Security Metric -- 3.2 Micro-Electrode-Dot-Array -- 3.2.1 Unique Features of MEDA -- 3.3 MEDA Attack Space -- 3.3.1 Granular Attacks -- 3.3.2 Shadow Attacks -- 3.4 MEDA Defense -- 3.4.1 Micro-Attack Aware Checkpoint -- 3.4.1.1 Golden Droplet Map Generation -- 3.4.2 Shadow Attack Aware Checkpoints -- 3.5 Experimental Results -- 3.5.1 Micro-Attack Aware Checkpoints -- 3.5.2 Shadow-Attack Aware Checkpoints -- 4 Tools for Security -- 4.1 Checkpoint-Based Security -- 4.2 Exact Analysis of Checkpoint-Based Security -- 4.2.1 Symbolic Formulation -- 4.2.2 Ensure Valid DMFB Execution -- 4.2.3 Ensure Expected Behavior at ; Checkpoints -- 4.2.4 Enforce an Attack -- 4.2.5 Exact Analysis of a Checkpoint -- 4.3 Application of Exact Analysis Tool -- 4.3.1 Considered Bioassays and Defense Strategies -- 4.3.2 Exact Analysis of Considered Defenses -- 4.3.3 Counter-Example-Guided Checkpoint Determination -- 4.3.3.1 Checkpoint Time-Step Derivation -- 4.3.3.2 Local Minimization -- 4.3.3.3 Experimental Results.; 4.4 Machine Learning for Attack Detection -- 4.4.1 The Motivation for Using ML in Attack Diagnosis -- 4.4.2 Data Format for FPVA -- 4.4.3 Data Acquisition -- 4.4.4 ML Models -- 4.4.5 Performance Metrics -- 4.5 Checkpointing Scheme -- 4.5.1 Trade-Offs -- 4.5.2 Smart Checkpointing -- 4.6 Experimental Results -- 4.6.1 Assessing ML Classifiers -- 4.6.2 Smart Checkpointing Assessment -- 5 Watermarking for IP Protection -- 5.1 Bio-protocol IP Development -- 5.1.1 Benchtop Bio-protocol -- 5.1.2 Adaptation to Microfluidic Platform -- 5.1.2.1 Outcome Objectives -- 5.1.2.2 Pathway Design -- 5.1.2.3 Parameter Range -- 5.1.3 Biochip Cyberphysical System -- 5.2 Watermarking-Based IP Protection -- 5.2.1 Bio-protocol IP Protection -- 5.3 Related Prior Works -- 5.3.1 Watermarking in Various Domains -- 5.3.2 Key Difference in the Proposed Solution -- 5.4 Watermarking of Bio-protocol Parameters -- 5.4.1 Watermarking of Synthesis Parameters -- 5.4.2 Watermarking of the Control Path Parameters -- 5.4.2.1 Global Control Path -- 5.4.2.2 Local Control Path -- 5.4.3 Case Study: Particle-Based Immunoassay -- 5.5 Watermarking of Sample Preparation -- 5.5.1 Basics of Sample Preparation -- 5.5.2 Constraint-Based Watermarking of Mixing Ratio -- 5.5.3 Case Studies -- 5.6 Security Analysis -- 5.6.1 Probability of Coincidence -- 5.6.2 Resilience to Finding Ghosts -- 5.6.3 Resilience to Tampering -- 5.6.3.1 Brute Force -- 5.6.3.2 Insert Own Signature -- 5.6.3.3 Watermark More Parameters -- 6 Obfuscation for IP Protection -- 6.1 Obfuscation Primitive -- 6.1.1 Sieve Valve -- 6.1.2 Multi-Height Valve -- 6.1.3 Ideal Obfuscation Primitive -- 6.2 Obfuscation for IP Protection -- 6.2.1 Dummy-Valve-Based Obfuscation -- 6.2.2 Reagent Load Obfuscation -- 6.2.3 Mix-Time Obfuscation -- 6.2.4 Structural Obfuscation -- 6.2.5 Reagent Volume Obfuscation -- 6.3 Design for Obfuscation.; 6.3.1 Undoing the Obfuscation -- 6.3.2 Design-for-Obfuscation Rules -- 6.3.2.1 Channel -- 6.3.2.2 Multiplexer -- 6.3.2.3 Mixer -- 6.3.2.4 Dummy Structures -- 6.3.2.5 Metering Circuits -- 6.4 Special Cases -- 6.4.1 Fluids with Color -- 6.4.2 Fluids with Dispensed Particles -- 6.4.3 Fluids with Sequential Order -- 6.5 Experimental Results -- 6.5.1 Fabrication -- 6.5.2 Chromatin Immunoprecipitation (ChIP) -- 6.5.2.1 Load and Mix-Time Obfuscation -- 6.5.2.2 Structural Obfuscation -- 6.5.2.3 Metering Obfuscation -- 6.5.2.4 Special Cases -- 6.5.3 Other Benchmarks -- 6.5.4 Analysis: Return on Investment -- 6.5.5 Comparison Against Other Techniques -- 6.6 Conclusion -- Future Outlook -- Side-Channel Assessment -- Conditional Bioassay Security -- Assessing Commercial Devices -- User-Verifiable Security -- Design for Security -- Bibliography -- Index.