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Record Nr. |
UNISA996320210503316 |
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Autore |
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
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Titolo |
Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (xxxv, 227 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Asymmetric warfare |
Lebanon War, 2006 |
Gaza War, 2008-2009 |
United States Military policy |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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"Prepared for the United States Army and the United States Air Force." |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; S.1. Levels of Adversaries and Their Associated Military Capabilities, with Examples; S.1. Air and Ground Power Across the Levels of Adversary Capabilities; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Purpose; Methodology; Monograph Organization; CHAPTER TWO: The Second Lebanon War; 2.1. Map of Southern Lebanon; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2006; What's in It for Us? The Problems with "Lessons Learned" from Lebanon; The IDF in Transition |
Confronting Protracted Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism Complex Concepts for Complex Problems: Systemic Operational Design; The IDF and Standoff Fires; Systemic Operational Design and Standoff Fires in Action: Defeating the Intifada; The Israeli Elite's Misperceptions About the Security Environment; IDF Deficiencies on the Eve of the Second Lebanon War; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hezbollah; Terrain; Hezbollah's Preparation of the Battlefield; Hezbollah: A Hybrid Adversary; 2.1. Hezbollah Rockets, 2006; 2.2. A Concealed Hezbollah Rocket System; 2.2. Other Hezbollah Weapons |
How the Second Lebanon War Unfolded Israel's Strategy in Lebanon; The Air War; 2.3. Map of Lebanese Targets Attacked by Israel; The Initial Ground War; Losing Support for the War; One Final Offensive; |
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2.4. Ground Scheme of Maneuver: Operation Changing Direction; 2.5. Final IDF Positions and Hezbollah Rocket-Launching Sites; The End of the War; Shortfalls Identified in the Second Lebanon War; Standoff Fires Are Critical, but Not Sufficient, to Achieving Objectives; The Short-Range Rocket Challenge; 2.6. The Changing Nature of Israeli Targets |
Civil-Military Issues, Unclear Objectives, and a Lack of Jointness Hezbollah Presented the IDF with a New Type of Adversary; CHAPTER THREE: Operation Cast Lead; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2008; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hamas; Terrain; Hamas' Preparation of the Battlefield; 3.1. The Gaza Strip; Hamas: A Hybrid Opponent, but Not Hezbollah; The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades; Internal Security Forces; Hamas' Weapons; 3.1. Hamas Rockets; How Operation Cast Lead Unfolded; The Air Campaign; The Ground Campaign |
3.2. The IDF Ground Campaign in Operation Cast Lead Hamas' Military Strategy During Operation Cast Lead; The End of Operation Cast Lead; Insights from Operation Cast Lead; Unresolved Problems in Determining Strategic "Ends"; Significant Improvement in the Military "Means"; Military Lessons Learned from Operation Cast Lead; Military Operations "Amongst the People"; Joint Fire and Maneuver Against Hybrid Opponents; Air-Ground Integration; 3.3. IDF Air Control Organizations; Operation Cast Lead Was Not a Robust Hybrid Case |
CHAPTER FOUR: The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Like Israel in 2006, the United States today is likely ill prepared for hybrid warfare. To identify lessons that the U.S. military might learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon, the author examines the state of the Israeli military before the Second Lebanon War, the lessons it learned during that conflict, the reforms it undertook to address its deficiencies, and how it fared during Operation Cast Lead three years later. |
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