1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910702926203321

Autore

Kotlikoff Laurence J

Titolo

Opting Out of Social Security and Adverse Selection / / Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent A. Smetters, Jan Walliser

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge, Mass, : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998

Washington, DC : , : Congressional Budget Office, , [1998]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource : illustrations (black and white);

Collana

NBER working paper series ; no. w6430

Classificazione

H55

Altri autori (Persone)

SmettersKent A

WalliserJan

Soggetti

Social Security and Public Pensions

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

February 1998.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Sommario/riassunto

This paper compares two general methods of privatization social security: forced participation in the new privatized system vs. letting people choose between the new system or staying in social security (i.e., opting out). Simulations are performed using a large scale perfect-foresight OLG simulation model that incorporates both intra-generational and inter-generational heterogeneity.  The decision of any agent to opt out is endogenous and depends on the opting out decisions of all other agents vis-...-vis factor prices. Various tax bases are considered in financing the transition path, as well as the perceived tax-benefit linkage due to the informational problems inherent in many social security systems. We consider two cases: full and no perception  Both methods of privatizing social security lead to large long- run gains for all lifetime income classes despite the intra-generational progressivity of social security, but differ in their short run effects due to adverse selection associated with opting out. Adverse selection is a key reason why many economists oppose opting out and why many plans to privatize social security systems mandate participation. This paper, however, shows this wisdom to be wide of the mark. Opting out is better at protecting the welfare of the initial elderly, even though forced participation protects their real value of social security benefits



because opting out continues to collect payroll tax revenue from those who stay with social security. Opting out can mean quicker transition paths by reducing social security wealth faster than forced participation, because many will forfeit their accrued claims as the price of opting out. Yet opting out, along with a decrease in the payroll tax rate is better at shifting the burden to future workers who benefit from privatization.

2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910976777803321

Autore

Engel David

Titolo

Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign of King Chulalongkorn / David Engel

Pubbl/distr/stampa

2020

[s.l.] : , : University of Michigan Press, , 2020

ISBN

9780472901944

047290194X

9780891480099

0891480099

9780472127986

0472127985

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource

Collana

Michigan Papers On South And Southeast Asia

Classificazione

HIS000000HIS048000

Soggetti

History / Asia / Southeast Asia

History

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Sommario/riassunto

This essay originated in an attempt to bring together the study of law and Thai history in a description of the transformation of Thailand during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as seen from a legal point of view. The resulting work is based for the most part upon those royal enactments from 1873 to 1910 which seemed most crucially to affect the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the



king and the rights of private citizens.