1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910974486403321

Titolo

Local commons and global interdependence : heterogeneity and cooperation in two domains / / edited by Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom

Pubbl/distr/stampa

London ; ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., : Sage Publications, 1995

London ; ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : , : Sage Publications, , 1995

ISBN

9780803979628

0803979622

9781446265178

144626517X

9781283881371

1283881373

9781446231548

1446231542

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (viii, 261 pages) : illustrations

Altri autori (Persone)

KeohaneRobert O <1941-> (Robert Owen)

OstromElinor

Disciplina

333.717

Soggetti

International cooperation

Environmental protection - International cooperation

Commons

Natural resources, Communal

Communication in international relations

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"Published under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University."

"Previously published as a special issue of the Journal of theoretical politics, vol. 6 (1994), no. 4".

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Contents; Notes on Contributors; Chapter 1 - Introduction; Part I - Theoretical Puzzles; Chapter 2 - The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships; Chapter 3 - The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions; Chapter 4 - Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems; Part II - Evidence from



the Laboratory; Chapter 5 - Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts; Part III - Evidence from the Field; Chapter 6 - Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action

Chapter 7 - The Conditions for Successful Collective Action Chapter 8 - Self-interest and Environmental Management; Chapter 9 - Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution; Index

Sommario/riassunto

This volume offers a synthesis of what is known about very large and very small common-pool resources. At an international level, states cannot appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce agreements they make to cooperate with one another. In some small-scale settings, participants may be just as helpless in calling on distant public officials to monitor and enforce their agreements.