Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence / / edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910973660603321
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2006
• ISBN: 1-282-09765-2; 9786612097652; 0-262-27073-0; 1-4294-7725-3
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (384 p.)
• Altri autori (Persone): CongletonRoger D; SwedenborgBirgitta <1941->
• Disciplina: 320.6
• Soggetti: Comparative government; Political science - Decision making; Rational choice theory; Political planning; Policy sciences; Economic policy; Constitutional law
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Introduction : Rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg -- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini -- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann -- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain -- Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller -- Common tax pool ; problems in federal systems / Brian Knight -- Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt -- Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney -- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjrn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton -- Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast.
• Sommario/riassunto: Leading scholars in rational choice analysis present the public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives on the political and economic effects of constitutional design and review the accumulating empirical evidence.