The fabric of character : Aristotle's theory of virtue / / Nancy Sherman

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910973418003321
• Autore: Sherman Nancy <1951->
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Oxford [England], : Clarendon Press; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1989
• ISBN: 0-19-159839-9; 1-281-98098-6; 9786611980986; 0-19-151975-8
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xiv, 213 pages)
• Collana: Clarendon Paperbacks
• Disciplina: 171.3
• Soggetti: Virtue - History; Character - History
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
• Nota di contenuto: 1. Introduction -- Character -- The inseparability of character and practical reason -- A practical theory -- ; 2. Discerning the particulars -- Equity within the law -- An alternative legislative model -- Perceiving ethical salience -- Seeing through emotions -- Strategies for expanding horizons -- ; 3. The choices of a character -- Present and future intention -- The practical syllogism -- Simple planning -- The more complex plans of a character -- Choice includes revision of ends -- Fitting contemplation in a life -- Good and bad characters -- ; 4. The shared life -- Aristotle and Kant -- Friends as external goods -- Happiness as including the happiness of others -- Friendship and wider altruism -- A friend as another but separate self -- Conditions for attachment -- Virtuous parents and virtuous children (or sons) -- The limitations of private education -- ; 5. The viability of a developmental model -- The rationality of the non-rational part -- The inappropriateness of harsh sanctions -- The intentionality of emotions -- Learning to see aright -- Learning to make choices -- Habituation as critical practice -- The pleasure intrinsic to practice -- Practice includes experience.
• Sommario/riassunto: The author argues that traditional conceptions of Aristotelian ; habituation have ignored the critical role of practical reason in both the development of virtue and the emotions constitutive of virtue. Virtue is, thus, neither the product of mindless drill nor of well-behaved, but ultimately stupid emotions.