Working the diaspora [[electronic resource] ] : the impact of African labor on the Anglo-American world, 1650-1850 / / Frederick C. Knight

• Record Nr.: UNISA996582070103316
• Autore: Knight Frederick C
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: New York, : New York University Press, 2010
• ISBN: 0-8147-4834-1; 0-8147-4912-7; 1-4416-3663-3
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (242 p.)
• Collana: Culture, Labor, History ; ; 8
• Disciplina: 331.11/7340970903
• Soggetti: Slave labor - America - History; Agricultural laborers - America - History; Africans - America - History; Black people - America - History; Agriculture - America - History; African diaspora
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 Material Life in West and West Central Africa, 1650−1800 -- 2 Seeds of Change -- 3 Cultivating Knowledge -- 4 In an Ocean of Blue -- 5 Slave Artisans -- 6 Natural Worship -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author
• Sommario/riassunto: From the sixteenth to early-nineteenth century, four times more Africans than Europeans crossed the Atlantic Ocean to the Americas. While this forced migration stripped slaves of their liberty, it failed to destroy many of their cultural practices, which came with Africans to the New World. In Working the Diaspora, Frederick Knight examines work cultures on both sides of the Atlantic, from West and West Central Africa to British North America and the Caribbean.Knight demonstrates that the knowledge that Africans carried across the Atlantic shaped Anglo-American agricultural development and made particularly important contributions to cotton, indigo, tobacco, and staple food cultivation. The book also compellingly argues that the work ; experience of slaves shaped their views of the natural world. Broad in scope, clearly written, and at the center of current scholarly debates, Working the Diaspora challenges readers to alter their conceptual frameworks about Africans by looking at them as workers who, through the course of the Atlantic slave trade and plantation labor, shaped the development of the Americas in significant ways.

First-Person Thought : Action, Identification and Experience / Maik Niemeck

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910972000003321
• Autore: Niemeck Maik
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Paderborn, : Brill | mentis, 2022
• ISBN: 3-96975-264-7
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (242 pages)
• Disciplina: 153
• Soggetti: Selbstbewusstsein; Bewusstsein; Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation; De Se Skeptizismus; Indexikalische Gedanken; Selbstsorge; Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein; Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein; Emotionen; Selbst-Repräsentationalismus; Self-Consciousness; Consciousness; Immunity to Error through Misidentification; De Se Skepticism; Indexical Thought; Self-Concern; Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness; Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness; Emotions; Self-Representationalism
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Includes index.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Content -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought? -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them -- 1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM) -- 1.4 Restricting the Essentiality Thesis -- 1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model -- 1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action -- 1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought -- 1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech -- 1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum? -- Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots -- 2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern? -- 2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component -- 2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern -- 2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself? -- 2.7 Some Empirical Support -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Getting IEM right -- 3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification -- 3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification -- 3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types? -- 3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens? -- 3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens -- 3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition? -- 3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence -- 3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession -- 3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification.; 3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility -- 3.7.4 Resumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM? -- 3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought -- 3.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification -- 4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw? -- 4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument -- 4.4.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs? -- 4.5 How to Deal with these Worries? -- 4.5.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem -- 4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception -- Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections -- 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation -- 5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness -- 5.4.3 Reply to the Objections -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Self-Representationalism -- 6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism -- 6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character -- 6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content? -- 6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves? -- 6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are? -- 6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between? -- 6.4 Potential Issues of ; Self-Representationalism -- 6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience.; 6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing -- 6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode -- 6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning Relations -- 6.9 Virtues of the Self-Mode Account -- 6.10 Concluding Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections -- Chapter 7. Conclusions -- Literature -- Index.
• Sommario/riassunto: The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.