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Record Nr. |
UNISA990006148250203316 |
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Autore |
USAI, Stefano |
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Titolo |
La stazione appaltante unica : guida all'obbligo della centralizzazione dei procedimenti di acquisto di beni, servizi e lavori dopo la legge di stabilità 2016 (L. 208/2015) : gli obblighi dei comuni non capouogo di provincia ... : aggiornato con: D.L. 210/2015 (Milleproproghe), Legge delega nuovo codice dei contratti / Stefano Usai |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santarcangelo di Romagna : Maggioli, 2016 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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Collana |
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Progetto ente locale ; 49 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Servizi pubblici - Appalti - Legislazione |
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Collocazione |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910970755903321 |
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Autore |
Masciandaro Donato |
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Titolo |
Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants / / Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn, Michael Taylor |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
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ISBN |
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9786612840982 |
9781462337637 |
1462337635 |
9781452765228 |
1452765227 |
9781451870053 |
1451870051 |
9781282840980 |
1282840983 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (36 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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QuintynMarc |
TaylorMichael |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Finance - State supervision |
Banks and banking, Central - State supervision |
Banking |
Banks and Banking |
Banks and banking |
Banks |
Business and Financial |
Civil service & public sector |
Depository Institutions |
Finance, Public |
Financial Institutions and Services: General |
Financial regulation and supervision |
Financial sector |
Financial services industry |
Financial services law & regulation |
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation |
Industries: Financial Services |
Law and legislation |
Legal support in revenue administration |
Macroeconomics |
Micro Finance Institutions |
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Mortgages |
Public Enterprises |
Public finance & taxation |
Public Finance |
Public sector |
Public-Private Enterprises |
Revenue |
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General |
United Kingdom |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-34). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; I. Introduction; II. Background; III. Analysis of Independence and Accountability Indices; A. Sample and Methodology; B. Main Findings; Tables; 1. Ratings on Supervisory Independence and Accountability, and on Independence in Monetary Policy; Figures; 1. Scatter Plot of Independence and Accountabilty Ratings; C. A Look into the Individual Criteria; 2. Spread Between Independence and Accountability Ratings; D. Location Has an Impact; 2. Governance Ratings by Location of Supervisor and Standard Deviation of Ratings in Italics; IV. The determinants of supervisory governance |
A. The Econometric ApproachB. Model to be Tested; C. The Results; 3. Ordered Logit Estimates with Total Governance as the Dependent Variable; 4. Ordered Logit Estimates with Independence as the Dependent Variable; 5. Ordered Logit Estimates with Accountability as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusions; Appendixes; I. Countries Selected for the Survey; II. Ratings by Criteria Across the Sample; III. Definition and Sources of Variables; IV. Correlation Matrix of Variables; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank. |
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