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1. |
Record Nr. |
UNIORUON00462401 |
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Autore |
HOLBOROW, Marnie |
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Titolo |
Language and Neoliberalism / Marnie Holborow |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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London ; New York, : Routledge, 2015 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Linguaggio - Aspetti politici |
Linguaggio - Studio e insegnamento |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910970557303321 |
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Autore |
VanDeMark Brian <1960-> |
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Titolo |
Into the quagmire : Lyndon Johnson and the escalation of the Vietnam War / / Brian VanDeMark |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New York ; ; Oxford, : Oxford University Press, 1995 |
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ISBN |
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0-19-988004-2 |
0-19-802298-0 |
1-280-45120-3 |
1-4237-4057-2 |
0-19-535719-1 |
1-60256-041-2 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (285 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - United States |
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - Causes |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliography: p. 223-238 and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION; 1. To the Crossroads in Vietnam; 2. ""The Day of Reckoning Is Coming,""; 3. ""Stable Government or No Stable Government,""; 4. ""A Bear by the Tail,""; 5. ""Where Are We Going?,""; 6. ""If I Were Ho Chi Minh, I Would Never Negotiate,""; 7. ""What in the World Is Happening?,""; 8. ""Can You Stop It?,""; 9. ""Better'n Owl,""; CONCLUSION; BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE; NOTES; INDEX; |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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In November of 1964, as Lyndon Johnson celebrated his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the government of South Vietnam lay in a shambles. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor described it as a country beset by ""chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit and motivation, lack of cohesion in the social structure, lack of experience in the conduct of government."" Virtually no one in the Johnson Administration believed that Saigon could defeat the communist insurgency--and yet by July of 1965, a mere nine months later, they would lock the United States |
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