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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910970500103321 |
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Autore |
Paiva Claudio |
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Titolo |
Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries : : Theory and Evidence / / Claudio Paiva, Rodrigo Moita |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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9786613821508 |
9781462301362 |
1462301363 |
9781452758206 |
1452758204 |
9781282448315 |
1282448315 |
9781451909739 |
145190973X |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (24 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Prices - Government policy |
Price regulation |
Business cycles |
Deflation |
Economic growth |
Energy: Demand and Supply |
Energy: General |
Fuel prices |
Gas industry |
Gasoline |
Inflation |
Investment & securities |
Investments: Energy |
Macroeconomics |
Oil prices |
Price Level |
Prices |
Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data) |
United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. BACKGROUND""; ""III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY""; ""IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE""; ""V. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry may fall in periods immediately preceding an election. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical model. Using quarterly data from 32 industrial and developing countries over 1978-2004, we find strong statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets. |
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