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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910968866303321 |
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Autore |
Ostergard Robert L |
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Titolo |
The development dilemma : the political economy of intellectual property rights in the international system / / Robert L. Ostergard, Jr |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New York, : LFB Scholarly Pub., 2003 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (199 p.) |
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Collana |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Intellectual property - Political aspects - Developing countries |
Intellectual property (International law) |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-183) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 A Clash of Interests: Development, Universal Human Rights, and Intellectual Property Rights -- 2 Policy Beyond Assumptions: Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth -- 3 What is best for the rest?: The Political and Economic Determinants of Intellectual Property Rights Protection -- 4 United States Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Policy in a Changing Global Environment -- 5 The Scramble for China -- 6 Life, Death and Intellectual Property: The South Africa-US Patent Dispute -- Conclusion -- Measurement Appendix -- Notes -- Data References -- References -- Index. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Ostergard argues that developing nations adopt stronger intellectual property rights protection in response to international pressures and not as a basis for economic growth and development. Using a new methodology for the measurement of intellectual property rights protection, Ostergard presents empirical evidence to show that, as developing nations become more integrated into the international economic system, they are faced with greater external pressures to increase intellectual property rights protection. Hence, their decision to adopt stronger intellectual property rights protection is purely political. This runs counter to Western arguments for intellectual property rights based on the assumption that stronger intellectual property rights promote economic growth and development. |
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