1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910968754103321

Autore

Ramakrishnan Uma

Titolo

The Incidence and Effectiveness of Prior Actions in IMF-supported Programs / / Uma Ramakrishnan, Alun Thomas

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006

ISBN

9786613828286

9781462353835

1462353835

9781452703725

1452703728

9781283515832

1283515830

9781451909265

1451909268

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (26 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

ThomasAlun

Soggetti

International finance

Budget planning and preparation

Budget Systems

Budget

Budgeting & financial management

Budgeting

Currency

Deflation

Expenditures, Public

Fiscal Policy

Fiscal policy

Fiscal stance

Foreign Exchange

Foreign exchange

Inflation

Macroeconomics

National Budget

National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General

Price Level

Prices

Public expenditure review

Public finance & taxation



Public Finance

Real exchange rates

United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"September 2006."

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE LITERATURE""; ""III. STYLIZED FACTS OF IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS""; ""IV. DETERMINANTS OF PRIOR ACTIONS""; ""V. PRIOR ACTIONS AND PROGRAM SUCCESS""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""; ""Appendix""

Sommario/riassunto

Prior actions are measures that need to be implemented prior to Board approval of an IMFsupported program. This paper examines whether such prior actions can signal a willingness to implement reforms, especially when the member's track record is weak. We find some support for this signaling role, particularly for programs supported by the General Resources Account (GRA). Controlling for the member's previous track record, prior actions are associated with greater compliance with other structural conditions, suggesting their possible use as a screening device. Moreover, prior actions set at program approval serve as a useful screening device and strengthen the macroeconomic targets set out in the IMF-supported program. The results also reveal a demonstrable screening effect on growth over the medium term, since the growth impact of the ratio of prior actions at the outset versus the rest of the program is significantly positive while the total number of prior actions is not statistically significant.