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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910968753603321 |
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Autore |
Bolt Wilko |
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Titolo |
On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting / / Wilko Bolt, Alexander Tieman |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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9786613825018 |
9781462333646 |
1462333648 |
9781452791500 |
1452791503 |
9781283512565 |
1283512564 |
9781451910155 |
1451910150 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (18 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Game theory |
Competition - Mathematical models |
Equilibrium (Economics) |
Asset prices |
Banking |
Banks and Banking |
Banks and banking |
Banks |
Competition |
Deflation |
Depository Institutions |
Environment |
Environmental Economics |
Environmental economics |
Environmental Economics: General |
Environmental sciences |
Finance |
Finance: General |
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) |
Inflation |
Macroeconomics |
Micro Finance Institutions |
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Mortgages |
Price Level |
Prices |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 16). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I Introduction""; ""II Defining the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting""; ""III Equilibrium analysis""; ""IV Finite horizon and equilibrium selection""; ""V An illustrative example""; ""VI Discussion and concluding remarks""; ""Appendix""; ""References"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature. |
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