1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910967122903321

Autore

Juan-Ramon V

Titolo

Banks During the Argentine Crisis : : Were they All Hurt Equally? Did they All Behave Equally? / / V. Juan-Ramon, Emiliano Basco, Carlos Quarracino, Adolfo Barajas

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006

ISBN

9786613830586

9781462357888

1462357881

9781452773360

145277336X

9781283518130

1283518139

9781451908381

1451908385

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (42 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

BarajasAdolfo

BascoEmiliano

QuarracinoCarlos

Soggetti

Banks and banking - Argentina

Bank failures - Argentina

Financial crises - Argentina

Bank deposits

Banking

Banks and Banking

Banks and banking

Banks

Commercial banks

Currencies

Debts, External

Depository Institutions

Event Studies

Exports and Imports

External debt

Financial institutions

Financial services

Foreign currency exposure

Foreign exchange market



Government and the Monetary System

Information and Market Efficiency

International economics

International Finance: General

International Lending and Debt Problems

Micro Finance Institutions

Monetary economics

Monetary Systems

Money and Monetary Policy

Money

Mortgages

Open Economy Macroeconomics

Payment Systems

Regimes

Standards

Argentina

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"February 2006."

Nota di contenuto

""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGENTINE BANKS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CRISIS""; ""III. DESCRIPTIVE LOOK AT ARGENTINE BANKS IN THE 1995�2001 PERIOD""; ""IV. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""

Sommario/riassunto

The simple answer to both questions in the title of this paper is: No. We concentrate on the three main risk elements that contributed to the banking system’s difficulties during the crisis: increasing dollarization of the balance sheet, expanding exposure to the government, and, eventually, the run on deposits. We find that there was substantial cross-bank variation in these elements—that is, not all banks were hurt equally by macroeconomic shocks. Furthermore, using panel data estimation for the 1998–2001 period, we find that depositors were able to distinguish high- from low-risk banks, and that individual banks’ exposure to currency and government default risk depended on bank fundamentals and other characteristics. Thus, not all banks behaved equally in the run-up to the crisis. Finally, our results have implications for the existence of market discipline in periods of stress and for banking regulation, which may have led banks to underestimate some of the risks they incurred.