United we stand? : divide-and-conquer politics and the logic of international hostility / / Aaron Belkin

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910966719403321
• Autore: Belkin Aaron <1966->
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Albany, : State University of New York Press, c2005
• ISBN: 9780791483787; 0791483789; 9781423743781; 1423743784
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (172 p.)
• Collana: SUNY series in global politics
• Disciplina: 327.1/6
• Soggetti: International relations; Conflict management; World politics
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-156) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Front Matter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Regime Vulnerability and International Conflict -- Theory -- Coup Risk and Military Division: Hostility within the Armed Forces and Regime Survival -- A Theory of Counterbalancing as a Cause of International Conflict -- Data -- Regime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict during the Cold War: A Quantitative Analysis -- Regime Vulnerability as a Cause of Counterbalancing in Syria in the Early 1970s -- When Dividing the Military Provides an Incentive for Conflict: Fragmented Military Forces and International Conflict in Shevardnadze’s Georgia -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index -- SUNY series in Global Politics
• Sommario/riassunto: It has long been assumed that leaders engage in international conflict to unify their followers—what is often called the "rally 'round the flag" hypothesis. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this hypothesis does not always provide a compelling explanation of the relationship between domestic politics and international conflict. In United We Stand? Aaron Belkin shows that in one important realm, civil-military relations, leaders often prefer divisiveness over cohesion. When they ; feel domestically vulnerable, leaders use international conflict in order to create and exacerbate rivalries among their own military forces to lower the risk of a coup and to contribute to the consolidation and stability of the political order. Case studies include post-Soviet Georgia and Syria.