1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910966450903321

Autore

Esterling Kevin M.

Titolo

The political economy of expertise : information and efficiency in American national politics / / Kevin M. Esterling

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Ann Arbor, MI, USA, : University of Michigan Press, 2004

University of Michigan Press

ISBN

1-282-44456-5

9786612444562

0-472-02390-X

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (301 p.)

Disciplina

322.430973

Soggetti

Pressure groups - United States

Policy sciences

POLITICAL SCIENCE

General

Political Institutions & Public Administration - U.S.,  Legislative Branch

Government - U.S

Law, Politics & Government

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Nota di contenuto

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- 1. Democracy in an Age of Information and Analysis -- Part I. The Politics of Policy Expertise -- 2. Policy Expertise and Accountability to Citizens -- 3. Policy Expertise and Interest Group Pressure -- 4. Policy Expertise and Congressional Learning -- Part II. The Case Studies -- 5. Introduction to the Case Studies -- 6. Emissions Trading and Confidence from EPA Experimentation -- 7. School Choice, Uncertainty, and Conceptual Ambiguities -- 8. HMOS and Methodological Ambiguities -- 9. Discussion of the Cases -- 10. The Political Economy of Expertise -- Appendix: Validity and Reliability Issues -- References -- Author Index -- Subject Index.

Sommario/riassunto

The Political Economy of Expertise is a carefully argued examination of how legislatures use expert research and testimony. Kevin Esterling



demonstrates that interest groups can actually help the legislative process by encouraging Congress to assess research and implement well-informed policies. More than mere touts for the interests of Washington insiders, these groups encourage Congress to enact policies that are likely to succeed while avoiding those that have too great of a risk of failure. The surprising result is greater legislative efficiency. The Political Economy of Expertise illustrates that this system actually favors effective and informed decision making, thereby increasing the likelihood that new policies will benefit the American public. Kevin M. Esterling is Assistant Professor at the University of California, Riverside.