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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910965542703321 |
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Autore |
Ueda Kenichi |
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Titolo |
Banks and Labor as Stakeholders : : Impact on Economic Performance / / Kenichi Ueda, Stijn Claessens |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
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ISBN |
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9786612841804 |
9781462341665 |
1462341667 |
9781452783383 |
1452783381 |
9781451870879 |
1451870876 |
9781282841802 |
1282841807 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (41 p.) |
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Collana |
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IMF Working Papers |
IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/229 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Banks and banking - State supervision - United States |
Working class - United States |
Corporate governance - United States |
Industrial productivity - United States |
Banking |
Banks and Banking |
Banks and banking |
Banks |
Depository Institutions |
Economic theory |
Employment protection |
Income economics |
Labor Contracts |
Labor economics |
Labor Economics: General |
Labor |
Labour |
Macroeconomics |
Macroeconomics: Production |
Manpower policy |
Micro Finance Institutions |
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Minimum wage |
Minimum wages |
Mortgages |
Production growth |
Production |
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy |
United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature; III. Data, Empirical Methodology and Regressions Results; A. Data; B. State-Level Regressions; C. State-Industry Level Benchmark Regressions; D. Robustness Checks; IV. Conclusions; Figures; 1a. The Adpotion of Financial Deregulation; 1b. The Adoption of Anti-Takeover Statutes; 1c. The Adpotion of Employment Protection; 2a. The Pattern of Financial Deregulation and Adoption of Employment Protection; 2b. The Pattern of Financial Deregulation and Adoption of Employment Protection; Tables; 1a. Correlations Among State-Level Institutional Change |
1b. Correlations Among Industry-Level Characteristics1c. Averages and Standard Deviations of Main Variables; 2a. State Level Regressions-Gross State Product; 2b. State Level Regressions-Non-Financial Sector Gross State Product; 3. State-Indistry Level Regressions-Benchmark (Schooling); 4. State-Industry Level Regressions-Intangible/Fixed Assets; 5. State-Industry Level Regressions-Sales/Fixed Assets; 6a. State-Indistry Level Regressions-Panel GMM for AR(1) Specification; 6b. State-Indistry Level Regressions- Panel GMM for AR(2) Specification; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Traditionally, the impacts of the rights of financial institutions and workers on corporate performance have been analyzed independently. Yet, theory clearly indicates that the combination of relative powers of different stakeholders affects a firm overall performance. Using U.S. state level and state-industry level data, we investigate how output growth is affected by bank branch deregulation and employment protection occurring over 1972-1993. We find that financial liberalization positively impact overall state growth but greater workers' rights affects it ambiguously. At the industry level, however, employment protection promotes those industries that are more knowledge intensive, while the effect of financial liberalization does not differ across industries that vary in external financing dependency. The results hold controlling for changes in shareholders' rights, which itself is not significant. The findings suggest that financial liberalization operates mostly through an efficiency channel, better reallocating resources across sectors, while employment protection creates higher incentives and encourages more sector-specific, human capital investments. Overall, the results show that the strength of stakeholders' protection affects performance through efficiency channels and provide support for a stakeholders' view of corporate governance. |
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