1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910964518303321

Autore

Sinnott-Armstrong Walter <1955->

Titolo

Moral skepticisms / / Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006

ISBN

0-19-988488-9

0-19-518772-5

1-4356-1847-5

9786611162641

1-281-16264-7

0-19-804061-X

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (286 p.)

Disciplina

171/.2

Soggetti

Ethics

Skepticism

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-262) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; PART I: ISSUES; Chapter 1. What Is Moral Epistemology?; Chapter 2. Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt?; Chapter 3. Are Any Moral Beliefs True?; Chapter 4. Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?; Chapter 5. In Contrast with What?; Chapter 6. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism; PART II: THEORIES; Chapter 7. Naturalism; Chapter 8. Normativism; Chapter 9. Intuitionism; Chapter 10. Coherentism; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; Z

Sommario/riassunto

Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls ""moderate moral skepticism,"" which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.