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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910962131103321 |
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Autore |
Maechler Andrea |
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Titolo |
Who Disciplines Bank Managers? / / Andrea Maechler, Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihak, Stéphanie Marie Stolz |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
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ISBN |
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9786612844591 |
9781462311361 |
1462311369 |
9781452783352 |
1452783357 |
9781451874174 |
1451874170 |
9781282844599 |
1282844598 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (76 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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CihakMartin |
SchaeckKlaus |
StolzStéphanie Marie |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Banks and banking |
Corporate governance |
Bank soundness |
Banking |
Banks and Banking |
Banks |
Corporate Finance and Governance: General |
Corporate Finance |
Corporate finance |
Corporations--Finance |
Crisis management |
Deposit insurance |
Depository Institutions |
Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models |
Discrete Regressors |
Econometric models |
Econometrics & economic statistics |
Econometrics |
Economic & financial crises & disasters |
Finance |
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Finance: General |
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation |
Financial Risk Management |
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation |
Logit models |
Micro Finance Institutions |
Mortgages |
Proportions |
United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Hypothesis; III. Methodology and Data; A. Methodology; B. Variable Selection; C. Dataset; 1. Histogram of Total Assets; 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations; IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; V. Multivariate Analysis; 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipine; 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score |
5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group)6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group); 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group; VI. Conclusions; I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score; II. Overview of Data and Sources; III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007; IV. Robustness Checks; References; Footnotes |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance. |
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