1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910961226103321

Autore

Kumhof Michael

Titolo

The Chicago Plan Revisited / / Michael Kumhof, Jaromir Benes

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012

ISBN

9781475587784

1475587783

9781475530056

1475530056

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (72 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

BenesJaromir

Disciplina

332.1/52

Soggetti

Banking law - United States

Banks and banking - United States

Accounting

Asset requirements

Bank credit

Banking

Banks and Banking

Banks and banking

Banks

Capital adequacy requirements

Credit

Debt Management

Debt

Debts, Public

Depository Institutions

Finance

Finance, Public

Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

Financial institutions

Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

Financial reporting, financial statements

Financial services law & regulation

Financial statements

Industries: Financial Services

Loans

Micro Finance Institutions

Monetary economics

Monetary Policy



Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General

Money and Monetary Policy

Money

Mortgages

Public Administration

Public debt

Public finance & taxation

Public Finance

Public financial management (PFM)

Public Sector Accounting and Audits

Sovereign Debt

United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Chicago Plan in the History of Monetary Thought; A. Government versus Private Control over Money Issuance; B. The Chicago Plan; III. The Model under the Current Monetary System; A. Banks; B. Lending Technologies; C. Transactions Cost Technologies; D. Equity Ownership and Dividends; E. Unconstrained Households; F. Constrained Households; G. Unions; H. Manufacturers; I. Capital Goods Producers; J. Capital Investment Funds; K. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Prudential Policy; 3. Fiscal Policy; 4. Government Budget Constraint; L. Market Clearing

IV. The Model under the Chicago PlanA. Banks; B. Households; C. Manufacturers; D. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Prudential Policy; 3. Fiscal Policy; 4. Government Budget Constraint; 5. Controlling Boom-Bust Cycles - Additional Considerations; V. Calibration; VI. Transition to the Chicago Plan; VII. Credit Booms and Busts Pre-Transition and Post-Transition; VIII. Conclusion; References; Figures; 1. Changes in Bank Balance Sheet in Transition Period (percent of GDP); 2. Changes in Government Balance Sheet in Transition Period (percent of GDP)

3. Changes in Bank Balance Sheet - Details (percent of GDP)4. Transition to Chicago Plan - Bank Balance Sheets; 5. Transition to Chicago Plan - Main Macroeconomic Variables; 6. Transition to Chicago Plan - Fiscal Variables; 7. Business Cycle Properties Pre-Transition versus Post-Transition

Sommario/riassunto

At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by



embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.