1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910961119903321

Autore

Odenius Jürgen

Titolo

Germany’s Corporate Governance Reforms : : Has the System Become Flexible Enough? / / Jürgen Odenius

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008

ISBN

9786612841309

9781462344697

1462344690

9781452704685

1452704686

9781451870374

145187037X

9781282841307

1282841300

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (21 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/179

Disciplina

658.4

Soggetti

Corporate governance - Germany

Corporate governance

Capital market

Capital markets

Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation

Corporate Governance

Finance

Finance: General

General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)

Income economics

Internal controls

Labor economics

Labor Economics: General

Labor

Labour

Legal support in revenue administration

Macroeconomics

Public finance & taxation

Public Finance

Revenue

Role & responsibilities of boards & directors



Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General

Germany

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Germany's Corporate Governance System; A. The Hallmarks of the System; Figure; 1. Equity Market Characteristics; B. Corporate Governance Reform: An Overview; III. The Effectiveness of Internal Control Mechanisms; Box; 1. The Societas Europea-A Step Towards More Flexible Corporate Governance?; IV. Conflict of Interest: Self-Dealing; V. External Control Mechanisms: The Market for Corporate Control; VI. Conclusions; References

Sommario/riassunto

This article reviews Germany's corporate governance system and the effectiveness of recent reforms. Since the early 1990s far-reaching reforms have complemented the traditional stakeholder system with important elements of the shareholder system. Instead of taking a view on the superiority of either system, this article raises the important question whether these reforms created sufficient flexibility for the market to optimize its corporate governance structure within well established social and legal norms. It concludes that there is scope for enhancing flexibility in three core areas, relating to (i) internal control mechanisms, especially the flexibility of board structures; (ii) self-dealing; and (iii) external control, particularly take-over activity.