1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910960887903321

Autore

Stehn Sven Jari

Titolo

Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System / / Sven Jari Stehn, Annalisa Fedelino

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009

ISBN

9786612843389

9781462369898

1462369898

9781452761169

1452761167

9781282843387

1282843389

9781451872712

1451872712

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (31 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

FedelinoAnnalisa

Disciplina

332.1/52

Soggetti

Intergovernmental fiscal relations - Germany

Fiscal policy - Germany

Economic theory

Expenditure

Expenditures, Public

Fiscal Policy

Fiscal policy

Fiscal sustainability

Macroeconomics

Macroeconomics: Production

National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General

Output gap

Production and Operations Management

Production

Public finance & taxation

Public Finance

Revenue administration

Revenue

Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General

Germany



Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving Länder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: Länder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007

A. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old Länder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. Länder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; References

Sommario/riassunto

Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings.