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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910960545003321 |
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Titolo |
Scientific communication and national security : a report / / prepared by the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C., : National Academy Press, 1982 |
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ISBN |
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1-280-12357-5 |
9786613527431 |
0-309-59398-0 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (205 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Communication in science |
National security |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Fifth printing, January 1984. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-89). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""BOOK-TITLE""; ""COPYRIGHT""; ""SPONSORS""; ""PREFACE""; ""CONTENTS""; ""EXECUTIVE SUMMARY""; ""UNWANTED TRANSFER OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY""; ""UNIVERSITIES AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION""; ""THE CURRENT CONTROL SYSTEM""; ""COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CONTROLS""; ""PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS""; ""Control of University Research Activities""; ""Unrestricted Areas of Research""; ""Classification""; ""Gray Areas""; ""The Export of Domestically Available Technical Data Under ITAR and EAR Regulations""; ""The Use of Voluntary Controls""; ""The Militarily Critical Technologies List"" |
""Technology Transfer to the Third World""""INTRODUCTION""; ""1 CURRENT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT UNWANTED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ITS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE""; """"; ""THE QUALITY OF THE EVIDENCE""; ""POTENTIAL CHANNELS AND TYPES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER""; ""THE OVERALL PROBLEM""; ""THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY""; ""THE SOVIET ACQUISITION EFFORT""; ""THE OVERALL PROBLEM""; ""THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY""; ""EVIDENCE OF THE EXTENT OF UNWANTED TRANSFER""; ""THE OVERALL PROBLEM""; |
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""THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY""; ""EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET ABSORPTION CAPACITY"" |
""EVIDENCE OF THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF TECHNOLOGY LOSSES""""THE OVERALL PROBLEM""; ""THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY""; ""PROJECTIONS FOR CHANGE""; ""2 UNIVERSITIES AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION""; ""UNIVERSITY RESEARCH AND TEACHING""; ""SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION""; ""BILATERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS""; ""NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES EXCHANGE PROGRAMS""; ""INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND EXCHANGE BOARD PROGRAM""; ""3 THE CURRENT CONTROL SYSTEM""; ""CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION""; ""EXPORT CONTROLS""; ""EAA AND EAR""; ""ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT AND ITAR"" |
""LIMITATIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL AUTHORITY""""CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS""; ""“VOLUNTARY� RESTRICTIONS""; ""CONTROLS ON FOREIGN VISITORS""; ""VISA CONTROLS""; ""EXCHANGE PROGRAMS""; ""4 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CONTROLS""; ""PREVENTING SOVIET MILITARY ADVANCES BASED ON U.S. RESEARCH""; ""THE RELATION TO CONTROLS""; ""THE PANEL'S ASSESSMENT""; ""Leakage and the Research Community""; ""FOSTERING U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH""; ""THE RELATION TO CONTROLS""; ""THE PANEL'S ASSESSMENT""; ""Openness and Military Strength""; ""Openness and Economic Strength"" |
""Security by Accomplishment""""PROTECTING EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL VALUES""; ""THE RELATION TO CONTROLS""; ""THE PANEL'S ASSESSMENT""; ""THE FEASIBILITY OF CONTROLS""; ""BALANCING COMPETING OBJECTIVES: THE PANEL'S JUDGMENT""; ""PRINCIPLES FOR UNIVERSITY RESEARCH""; ""GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFIED AND GRAY-AREA RESEARCH""; ""5 IMPROVING THE CURRENT SYSTEM""; ""THE WORKABILITY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM CAN BE IMPROVED""; ""EXPORT CONTROLS AND DOMESTICALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION""; ""PRIORITIES WITHIN THE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM""; ""MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES LIST""; ""VOLUNTARY CONTROLS"" |
""STAFFING DEFICIENCIES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The military, political, and economic preeminence of the United States during the post-World War II era is based to a substantial degree on its superior rate of achievement in science and technology, as well as on its capacity to translate these achievements into products and processes that contribute to economic prosperity and the national defense. The success of the U.S. scientific enterprise has been facilitated by many factors, important among them the opportunity for American scientists and engineers to pursue their research-and to communicate with each other-in a free and open environment. During the last two administrations, however, concern has arisen that the characteristically open U.S. scientific community has served as one of the channels through which critical information and know-how are flowing to the Soviet Union and to other potential adversary countries; openness in science is thus perceived to present short-term national security risks in addition to its longer-term national security benefits in improved U.S. military technology. The Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security was asked to examine the various aspects of the application of controls to scientific communication and to suggest how to balance competing national objectives so as to best serve the general welfare. The Panel held three two-day meetings in Washington at which it was briefed by representatives of the departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and by representatives of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. The |
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Panel also heard presentations by members of the research community and by university representatives. In addition to these briefings, the Rand Corporation prepared an independent analysis of the transfer of sensitive technology from the United States to the Soviet Union. To determine the views of scientists and administrators at major research universities, the Panel asked a group of faculty members and administrative officials at Cornell University to prepare a paper incorporating their own views and those of counterparts at other universities. The main thrust of the Panel's findings is completely reflected in this document. However, the Panel has also produced a classified version of the subpanel report based on the secret intelligence information it was given; this statement is available at the Academy to those with the appropriate security clearance. |
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