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1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910473055303321 |
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Autore |
Chauvet, Victor |
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Titolo |
Manzoni, Stendhal, Hugo e altri saggi su classici e romantici / Victor Chauvet ; a cura di Carlo Cordié |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Catania, : Università, Biblioteca della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia, 1958 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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Collana |
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Università di Catania, Biblioteca della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia |
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Disciplina |
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Locazione |
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Collocazione |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910960082903321 |
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Autore |
Pani Marco |
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Titolo |
Hold Your Nose and Vote : : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? / / Marco Pani |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
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ISBN |
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9786612843037 |
9781462335596 |
1462335594 |
9781452758145 |
145275814X |
9781451872309 |
1451872305 |
9781282843035 |
1282843036 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (34 p.) |
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Collana |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Political corruption |
Democracy |
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations |
Budget planning and preparation |
Budget Systems |
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Budget |
Budgeting & financial management |
Budgeting |
Bureaucracy |
Corporate crime |
Corruption |
Criminology |
Economics |
Expenditure |
Expenditures, Public |
National Budget |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General |
Political Economy |
Political economy |
Public finance & taxation |
Public Finance |
Tax incentives |
Taxation |
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General |
White-collar crime |
Italy |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, some citizens can indirectly benefit from corruption. The paper shows that, under this condition, if the citizens anticipate a shift in policy preferences in favor of higher public expenditure, they may support institutional arrangements that favor corruption (such as a weak enforcement of the law) in order to alter future policy decisions in their favor. This result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in a democracyto some failure on the part of |
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the voters or the electoral system. It also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community. |
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