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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910958103003321 |
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Autore |
Ellis Ralph D |
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Titolo |
Questioning consciousness : the interplay of imagery, cognition, and emotion in the human brain / / Ralph D. Ellis |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Amsterdam ; ; Philadelphia, : J. Benjamins, c1995 |
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ISBN |
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1-283-17451-0 |
9786613174512 |
90-272-8360-5 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (270 p.) |
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Collana |
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Advances in consciousness research, , 1381-589X ; ; v. 2 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Consciousness |
Apperception |
Human information processing |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [239]-256) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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QUESTIONING CONSCIOUSNESS; Editorial page; Title page; Copyright page; Table of contents; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS; INTRODUCTION Differences between Conscious and Non-conscious Processing: Why They Make a Difference; CHAPTER ONE. The Relation between Imaginary and Perceptual Contents; CHAPTER TWO. From Images to Concepts; CHAPTER THREE. Images, Logic, and Mental Development; CHAPTER FOUR. The Ontological Status of Consciousness; CHAPTER FIVE. The Priority of Process over Substratum: Consciousness as an Organic Phenomenon; CHAPTER SIX. Memory, Emotion, and Symbolization |
CONCLUSION The Centrality of SubjunctivesREFERENCES; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Questioning Consciousness brings together neuroscientific, psychological and phenomenological research, combining in a readable format recent developments in image research and neurology. It reassesses the mind-body relation and research on 'mental models', abstract concept formation, and acquisition of logical and apparently 'imageless' inference skills. It is argued that to be conscious of an object is essentially to imagine in a habituated way what would happen if we were to perform certain actions in relation to the object; and that |
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