1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910957189303321

Autore

Coady David

Titolo

Targeting Social Transfers to the Poor in Mexico / / David Coady, Susan Parker

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009

ISBN

9786612842818

9781462344680

1462344682

9781452792453

1452792453

9781282842816

1282842811

9781451872071

1451872070

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (32 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

ParkerSusan

Disciplina

332.152

Soggetti

Public welfare - Mexico

Social service - Mexico

Aggregate Factor Income Distribution

Budget planning and preparation

Budget Systems

Budget

Budgeting & financial management

Budgeting

Consumption

Demographic Economics: General

Demography

Economics

Education

Education: General

Household consumption

Income distribution

Income inequality

Income

Macroeconomics

National accounts

National Budget

National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs



Personal income

Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions

Population & demography

Population and demographics

Population

Public financial management (PFM)

Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence

Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics: Household Analysis: General

Mexico

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Program and Data Description; Program Description; Tables; 1. Variables and Weights Used to Estimate the Discriminant Proxy-Means Score; Data Description; 2. Transfer Levels by Grade and Gender (pesos per month, 2002); III. Methodology; IV. Results; Figures; 1. Unconditional Probabilities; Targeting Performance Across Participation Stages; 2. Conditional Probabilities; 3. Targeting Performance by Stage; 4. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; 5. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; Policy Reform Simulations

3. Trade-off Between Vertical Targeting Performance and Program CoverageV. Summary; Appendix; Details of Simulations Estimating Targeting Implications of Universal Knowledge; Appendix Tables; 1. Results for Conditional Application and Acceptance Outcomes and Consumption Model; 2. Application Outcomes Under Universal Knowledge; References

Sommario/riassunto

Mexico’s main social support program, Oportunidades, combines two methods to target cash to poor households: an initial self-selection by households who acquire knowledge about the program and apply for benefits, followed by an administrative determination of eligibility based on a means test. Self-selection improves targeting by excluding high-income households, while administrative targeting does so mainly by excluding middle-income households. The two methods are complementary: expanding program knowledge across households substantially increases applications from non-poor households, thus reinforcing the importance of administrative targeting. The paper shows that targeting can be further improved through redesigning the means test and differentiating transfers according to demographic characteristics.