| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910956810603321 |
|
|
Autore |
Roubini Nouriel |
|
|
Titolo |
Bailouts or bail-ins? : responding to financial crises in emerging economies / / Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Washington, DC, : Institute for International Economics, 2004 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-281-39714-8 |
9786611397142 |
0-88132-460-4 |
1-4356-5535-4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (442 p.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Altri autori (Persone) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Loans, Foreign - Developing countries |
Financial crises - Developing countries |
International finance |
Debt - Developing countries |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
"A Council on Foreign Relations book." |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references (p. 391-405) and index. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Why Crisis Resolution? -- Purging Unhelpful Myths -- Closing the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality -- Agenda for Reform -- Structure of the Book -- Chapter 2 New Nature of Emerging-Market Crises -- Sources of Vulnerability in Emerging-Market Crises -- Interpreting Recent Crises -- Conclusions -- Chapter 3 Analytical Literature on Crisis Resolution -- Four Approaches to Crisis Resolution -- Crisis Resolution in IMF's Absence -- IMF, Crises of Creditor Coordination, and Moral Hazard -- Do Partial Bailouts Ever Work? -- Policy Implications and Suggestions for Further Research -- Chapter 4 Experience with Bailouts and Bail-ins -- Experience with Official Financing -- Experience with Bail-in Policies: Rollover Arrangements and Debt Exchanges -- Lessons for the Official Sector -- Lessons from Bond Restructurings -- Lessons from Restructuring of Bank Claims -- Conclusions -- Chapter 5 Official Policy Toward Crisis Resolution -- Reaction to Mexico's Bailout -- Reform of the International Financial Architecture -- The Debate Fractures -- A New Administration, a New |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Policy? -- Conclusions -- Chapter 6 Responding to Liquidity Shortages -- When Is Official Liquidity Support Warranted? -- Are Targeted Debt Reschedulings Inequitable? -- Risks of Gradual Escalation -- Case for Pragmatism -- Private-Sector Financial Difficulties -- Alternative Approaches to Liquidity Crises -- What Is the Right Policy? -- Chapter 7 Seniority of Sovereign Debts -- Relative Treatment of Different Sovereign Claims -- Domestic Versus External Debt -- Arguments in Favor of a Formal Debt Seniority Regime -- Conclusion -- Chapter 8 Legal Reform -- Potential Obstacles to Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Approaches to Legal Reform -- Codes and Committees -- Assessing Reform Proposals -- Conclusion. |
Chapter 9 Recommendations for Reform -- "Hardware" Largely in Place -- Problems with Crisis Resolution "Software" -- Moving from Problems to Solutions -- Conclusion -- Appendix A Tables -- References -- Glossary -- Index. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
The study calls for a two-track strategy: first, deep multilateral liberalization involving phased but complete elimination of industrial-county protection and deep reduction of protection by at least the middle-income developing countries, albeit on a more gradual schedule; and second, immediate free entry for imports from high risk low-income countries (heavily indebted poor countries, least developed countries, and sub-Saharan Africa), coupled with a 10-year tax holiday for direct investment in these countries. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |