1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910956119003321

Autore

Chirwa Ephraim

Titolo

Donor Herding and Domestic Debt Crisis / / Ephraim Chirwa, Montfort Mlachila, Yohane Anthony Khamfula

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006

ISBN

9786613829863

9781462309450

1462309453

9781452746111

1452746117

9781283517416

1283517418

9781451909036

1451909039

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (10 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

KhamfulaYohane Anthony

MlachilaMontfort

Soggetti

Debts, External - Developing countries - Econometric models

Economic assistance - Developing countries - Econometric models

Banks and Banking

Banks

Debt default

Debt Management

Debt

Debts, External

Debts, Public

Depository Institutions

Domestic debt

Economic & financial crises & disasters

Exports and Imports

Finance

Financial Crises

Financial crises

Financial Risk Management

Industries: Financial Services

Interest rates

Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects

International economics



International Lending and Debt Problems

Loans

Micro Finance Institutions

Mortgages

Public finance & taxation

Public Finance

Real interest rates

Sovereign Debt

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"April 2006."

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE MODEL""; ""III. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES""

Sommario/riassunto

This paper presents a new model based on the loan-pushing model by Basu (1991) to show how a domestic debt crisis can occur in a low-income country following donor herding. The model focuses on the rational herding behavior of donors due to payoff and information externalities. Although there are many theoretical models on herding behavior, these models have not formally considered the relationship between donor herding and domestic debt crisis in a low-income country. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap. The paper shows that due to donor herding behavior a domestic debt crisis can occur once the actual debt level is above the desirable one.