Regulatory Capture in Banking

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910955017903321
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
• ISBN: 9786613829108; 9781462342754; 1462342752; 9781452781433; 1452781435; 9781283516655; 1283516659; 9781451908305; 145190830X
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (25 p.)
• Collana: IMF Working Papers
• Soggetti: Banks and banking - State supervision; Financial institutions - State supervision; Asset requirements; Bank regulation; Banking; Banks and Banking; Banks and banking; Banks; Business and Financial; Capital adequacy requirements; Crisis management; Deposit insurance; Depository Institutions; Economic & financial crises & disasters; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation; Financial regulation and supervision; Financial Risk Management; Financial services industry; Financial services law & regulation; General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation; Law and legislation; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages; State supervision; United States
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: "January 2006."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-23).
• Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. SUSCEPTIBILITY OF BANKING REGULATION TO CAPTURE""; ""III. A MODEL OF BANK REGULATION WITH MORAL HAZARD""; ""IV. COMPETITION BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
• Sommario/riassunto: Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions.