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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910829075703321 |
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Autore |
Van Cleve James |
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Titolo |
Problems from Reid / / James Van Cleve |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New York, New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015 |
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©2015 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (567 p.) |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1. Sensation and Perception; A. Explanations of Terms; B. Sensation versus Perception; C. Reid's Threefold Account of Perception; D. The Conception in Perception; E. Perception and Belief; F. Consciousness and Attention; G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive?; 2. Reid's Nativism; A. Reid's Nativism; B. Natural Signs; C. The Experimentum Crucis; D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis; E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds?; F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism; 3. Direct Realism versus the Way of Ideas; A. The Way of Ideas |
B. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a DistanceC. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume's Table Argument; D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision; E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche's Master Argument; F. Three Forms of Direct Realism; G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Perception?; H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist?; I. All Perception Is Direct Perception; 4. Primary and Secondary Qualities; A. Reid's Relation to Locke and Berkeley; B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical?; C. Dispositions or Bases? |
D. Intrinsic or Extrinsic?E. Fixed or Variable?; F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid's; 5. Acquired Perception; A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception; B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception?; C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only?; D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of Our Original Perceptions?; E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception?; F. Is Reid |
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Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception?; 6. The Geometry of Visibles; A. The Properties of Spherical Figures; B. Depth Is Not Perceived |
C. The Argument from IndistinguishabilityD. Visibles as Sense Data; E. Coincidence as Identity; F. Angell's Approach; G. The Argument of Paragraph 4; H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles; I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism?; J. What Are Visibles?; K. Direct Realism and Seeing What We Touch; L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects; M. Mediated but Direct?; 7. Erect and Inverted Vision; A. The Naïve Puzzle and Rock's Question; B. The Classical Solution; C. Berkeley's Solution(s) to the Naïve Puzzle |
D. Reid's Alternative to Berkeley's SolutionE. Answers to Rock's Question; F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses; G. Perceptual Adaptation; 8. Molyneux's Question; A. Molyneux's Question; B. Empirical Evidence; C. Berkeley's Answer; D. Reid's Answer(s); E. Is Berkeley's Modus Tollens Reid's Modus Ponens?; F. The One-Two Molyneux Question; G. Concluding Confession; 9. Memory and Personal Identity; A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory; B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory; C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past; D. The Specious Present |
E. Personal Identity |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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James Van Cleve here shows why Thomas Reid (1710-96) deserves a place alongside the other canonical figures of modern philosophy. He expounds Reid's positions and arguments on a wide range of topics, taking interpretive stands on points where his meaning is disputed and assessing the value of his contributions to issues philosophers are discussing today. Among the topics Van Cleve explores are Reid's account of perception and its relation to sensation, conception, and belief; his nativist account of the origin of the concepts of space and power; his attempt to clear the way for the belief that |
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