1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910827118903321

Titolo

Naturalism and normativity / / edited by Mario De Caro and David Macarthur

Pubbl/distr/stampa

New York, : Columbia University Press, 2010

ISBN

0-231-50887-5

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (378 p.)

Collana

Columbia themes in philosophy

Altri autori (Persone)

De CaroMario

MacarthurDavid

Disciplina

146

Soggetti

Naturalism

Normativity (Ethics)

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; Introduction: Science, Naturalism, and the Problem of Normativity; Part I: Conceptual and Historical Background; 1: The Wider Significance of Naturalism a Genealogical Essay (Akeel Bilgrami); 2: Naturalism and Quietism (Richard Rorty); 3: Is Liberal Naturalism Possible?(Mario De Caro and Alberto Voltolini); Part II: Philosophy and the Natural Sciences; 4: Science and Philosophy (Hilary Putnam); 5: Why Scientific Realism May Invite Relativism (Carol Rovane); Part III: Philosophy and the Human Sciences; 6: Taking the Human Sciences Seriously (David Macarthur)

7: Reasons and Causes Revisited (Peter Menzies)Part IV: Meta-Ethics and Normativity; 8: Metaphysics and Morals (T. M . Scanlon); 9: The Naturalist Gap in Ethics (Erin I. Kelly and Lionel K. McPherson); 10: Phenomenology and the Normativity of Practical Reason (Stephen L. White); Part V: Epistemology and Normativity; 11: Truth as Convenient Friction (Huw Price); 12: Exchange on "Truth as Convenient Friction" (Richard Rorty and Huw Price); 13: Two Directions for Analytic Kantianism Naturalism and Idealism (Paul Redding); Part VI: Naturalism and Human Nature

14: How to be Naturalistic Without Being Simplistic in the Study of Human Nature (John DupreĢ)15: Dewey, Continuity, and McDowell (Peter Godfrey-Smith); 16: Wittgenstein and Naturalism (Marie McGinn); Contributors; Index



Sommario/riassunto

Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri. Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that there must be a transcendent realm of norms. Naturalism and Normativity engages with both sides of t