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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910826876803321 |
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Autore |
Messmacher Miguel |
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Titolo |
Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? / / prepared by Miguel Messmacher |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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[Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-1248-9 |
1-4527-8647-X |
1-283-51558-X |
1-4519-0860-1 |
9786613828033 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (30 p.) |
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Collana |
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IMF working paper ; ; WP/06/64 |
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Soggetti |
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Insurance - Econometric models |
Moral hazard - Econometric models |
International finance - Econometric models |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default. |
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