Pearson and Canada's role in nuclear disarmament and arms control negotiations, 1945-1957 / / Joseph Levitt

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910826201403321
• Autore: Levitt Joseph <1920->
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Montreal, [Canada] : , : McGill-Queen's University Press, , 1993; ©1993
• ISBN: 1-282-85591-3; 9786612855917; 0-7735-6337-7
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (342 pages) : illustrations, photographs
• Disciplina: 327.1/74
• Soggetti: Nuclear disarmament - Canada; Nuclear arms control - Canada; Canada Foreign relations 1945-
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Includes index.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Front Matter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- The Strategic Setting -- Pearson on the Superpower Confrontation -- Canada and the Baruch Plan, 1945-46 -- The Propaganda Wars: Defending the Baruch Plan, 1947-49 -- The Erosion of the Majority Plan, 1950-53 -- Narrowing the Gap between East and West, 1954-55 -- Working to Maintain Franco-American Harmony, 1955-56 -- Final Negotiations, 1956-57. The Nuclear Test Ban and Aerial Inspection -- Conclusion -- Key Actors and Meetings -- Bibliography -- Index
• Sommario/riassunto: In Pearson and Canada's Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations Joseph Levitt traces the history of these negotiations from the Canadian diplomatic perspective. He analyses the various proposals and documents the reactions of Pearson and his colleagues. Levitt reveals Pearson's own view of the strategic stalemate between the USSR and the United States -- Pearson did not believe that an open and liberal society such as the United States would ever launch an unprovoked offensive on the USSR; he thought instead that the danger of a major military confrontation arose only from the possibility that the Soviet Union might attack. Consequently the main thrust of ; Canadian diplomatic activity in these negotiations was not prevention of an American arms build-up but support of a strategy which would compel the USSR to accept an agreement that would benefit the Americans militarily or, failing that, to hold the Soviets responsible for the impasse in the talks and thus win the all-important propaganda war.