The lessons and non-lessons of the air and missile campaign in Kosovo / / Anthony H. Cordesman

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910826130003321
• Autore: Cordesman Anthony H
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Westport, Conn. : , : Praeger, , 2001
• ISBN: 0-313-07392-9; 0-313-04874-6
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xii, 399 pages) : illustrations, maps
• Disciplina: 949.7103
• Soggetti: Bombing, Aerial - Yugoslavia; Kosovo War, 1998-1999 - Aerial operations
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [378]-399).
• Nota di contenuto: Cover -- The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo -- Contents -- 1 The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo -- 2 The Historical Background: The Course and Character of the NATO Campaign -- BOSNIA AND THE DAYTON ACCORDS BECOME THE PRELUDE TO WAR IN KOSOVO -- THE DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE -- PEACE TALKS END IN WAR -- Serbia's Grand Strategic and Tactical Mistakes -- NATO's Blundering into Large-Scale War -- OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN -- The Phases and Non-Phases of the Air and Missile Campaign -- The Road to Escalation -- Expanding the Target Base and Scale of Military Action -- NATO's Changing Objectives -- NATO Moves Towards Decisive Force -- Ending the Air and Missile Campaign -- Why Serbia Conceded -- Estimates of the Overall Impact of the Air and Missile Campaign -- INCREASES IN NATO FORCES AND LEVELS OF EFFORT -- NATO Naval Forces -- NATO Aircraft Numbers -- Sortie Rates and Intensity -- RELIANCE AND NON-RELIANCE ON PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS -- Analysis by Farce: The Imprecise Nature of Precision Engagement -- British and French Use of Precision and Non-Precision Weapons -- The Limits of Precision Weapons and Precision Engagement -- WEATHER -- NATO'S LIMITED LOSSES -- CONFLICT TERMINATION -- 3 The Grand Strategic Aspects of Kosovo: The "Whys" and "Hows" of the War and the Implications for Strategy and ; Force Planning -- THE "WHYS" OF GOING TO WAR -- A Lack of Criteria for Deciding on Military Action -- The Dilemmas in Deciding on Peacemaking -- THE "HOWS" OF GOING TO WAR -- COALITION WARFARE AND LEVELS OF COMMITMENT -- The Contributions of the US and Europe -- Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Air War -- Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Incident at Pristina -- Unity of Command versus Unity of Coalition.; Lessons for the NATO Alliance -- US STRATEGY, FORCE PLANNING, AND DEFENSE SPENDING -- Major Theater War (MTW) Operation Plans -- Problems in US Defense Spending and Readiness -- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton -- Chief of Staff, US Army, General Dennis J. Reimer -- Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay L. Johnson -- Commandant of the Marine Corps, Charles C. Krulak -- Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Michael E. Ryan -- The Force Drawdown Imposed by Kosovo -- Being the World's Only Superpower Without Paying for the Power -- 4 The Strategic Impact and Military Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign -- THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF THE WAR IN KOSOVO -- MORE THAN AIR POWER LED TO NATO'S VICTORY -- THE RELEVANCE OF KOSOVO TO OTHER WARS -- ROB PETER TO PRAISE PAUL? -- STRATEGIC LIMITS ON IMPACT OF AIR POWER IN KOSOVO: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE? -- "SHOCK AND AWE" OR "LIMITS AND RESTRAINT" -- 5 The Problem of "Perfect" and "Bloodless" War -- THE ABSURDITY OF PERFECTION -- "BLOODLESS WAR": THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING NO OR MINIMAL CASUALTIES -- Casualties and Staying at Medium to High Altitudes -- Overall Sensitivity to Casualties -- THE PROBLEM OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE -- The Chinese Embassy Bombing -- The Real-World Problems in Targeting in Wartime -- The Results of the US Investigation into the Bombing -- The CIA Accepts the Blame -- The Imperfect Nature of Perfect War -- NATO and Serbian Collateral Damage Claims: Hiding the Truth with a Liar's Contest -- The Tragedy of Moral and Analytic Corruption -- The Worthless Character of Serbian Claims -- Outside Studies and Analyses: The Human Rights Watch and OSCE Reports -- Lessons for the Future -- Economic Aftermaths and Environmental Effects -- THE PROBLEM OF TARGETING -- Improvising a New Approach to Targeting -- National versus NATO Targeting.; Changes in the Targeting Effort over Time -- Precision Targeting, Precision Engagement, and Precision Intelligence -- Targeting and C4: "Dynamic Battle Control" -- THE NEW CONDITIONS OF WAR -- 6 NATO Reporting on the Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign -- EFFECTIVENESS REPORTING AS OF APRIL 13: THE FIRST THREE WEEKS -- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO AIRPOWER FROM DAY 20 TO DAY 24 -- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN: DAY 25 TO DAY 50 -- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN: DAY 50 TO THE END -- BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, THE "FOG OF WAR," AND THE "FOG OF SELF-DECEPTION" -- The Pentagon Lies to Congress and the American People -- The Barry and Thomas Critique of the Pentagon Report -- The Fog of War, Surgical Bombing, and the Revolution in Military Affairs -- 7 Strategic Bombing -- THE US POST-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN -- KOSOVO, NATO, AND STRATEGIC BOMBING -- EVOLVING A COMMAND STRUCTURE IN MID-CRISIS -- THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL BASE THAT NATO ATTACKED -- The Vulnerabilities of Serbia's Economy and Infrastructure -- Unrealistic NATO Claims versus Unrealistic Serbian Claims -- FUEL, PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS (POL) TARGET GROUPS -- Wartime Gamesmanship with Damage Assessment -- Guessing at the Impact from a Postwar Perspective -- Strikes Against ; Industry Support and Infrastructure Target Groups -- Strikes Against Electric Power Facilities -- LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCs) AND SUPPLY ROUTE TARGET GROUPS -- COMMAND AND CONTROL TARGET GROUPS -- 8 The Air and Missile War and Serbian Air and Land Force Targets -- INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (IADS) TARGET GROUPS -- The Yugoslavian Air Force -- NATO Attacks on the Serbian Air Force During the Campaign -- NATO Claims at the End of the Campaign and Possible Lessons -- The Yugoslavian Land-Based Air Defense System.; The Size and Nature of Serbian Forces -- NATO's Wartime Claims -- Damage Assessments from May to the End of the Conflict -- Damage Assessment after the War and the Impact of Serbian Air Defenses in Forcing NATO to Fly at Higher Altitudes -- Suppression versus Destruction -- The Problem of Survivability -- SERBIAN ARMY AND SPECIAL POLICE TARGET GROUPS -- The Size and Capability of Serbian Land Forces -- NATO Attacks on Serbian Forces and Major Weapons -- The Problems of Operational Effectiveness -- The Impact of Problems in Reporting on the Strikes on Serbian Land Forces and Battle Damage Assessment -- NATO's Damage Claims in Mid-May -- NATO's Damage Claims on June 10 -- Serbia's False Damage Claims and Deception Efforts -- NATO's Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Efforts -- British Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Claims -- US Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Efforts -- The Lessons of Attacks on Serbian Ground Forces -- THE SERBIAN BUILD-UP, SERBIAN OPERATIONS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE -- Serbian and NATO Actions in 1998 -- The FRY/Serbian Build-Up in 1999 -- The Serbian Build-Up During the War -- Serbian Use of Human Shields and Manipulation of the Media -- A Serbian View of the Build-Up -- Lessons from the Serbian Build-Up -- 9 The "Ground Option": The Possible Impact of NATO Planning for an Invasion -- THE QUIET SHIFT TOWARDS A GROUND OPTION -- PUTTING ALL THE OPTIONS ON THE TABLE -- LATE MAY: ON THE EDGE OF GOING TO A GROUND OPTION -- 10 The "Ground Option": The Role of the KLA -- THE REAL-WORLD GROUND OPTION THAT NATO DID NOT DISCUSS -- SYNERGY? GUESSING AT THE IMPACT OF AIRPOWER ON THE KLA GROUND OPTION AND VICE VERSA -- LESSONS FROM THE KLA GROUND OPTION -- 11 Detailed Lessons and Issues of the Air and Missile Campaign -- AIR SUPERIORITY -- THE A-10 -- THE AH-64 -- Tactical and Technical Problems.; Readiness and Training Problems and Detailed Technical Issues -- Command Problems and Failure to Prepare for Independent Operations -- Mobility and Deployability -- Politics versus Technical and Tactical Problems -- Lessons and Non-Lessons -- ASYMMETRIC WEAPONS AND WARFARE -- AV-8B HARRIER -- BOMBERS: THE B-2, B-1, AND B-52 AND GLOBAL FORCE INTEGRATION -- Global Force Integration -- Global Attack -- Levels of Bomber Action -- Uncertain Bomber Effectiveness, Certain Bomber Politics -- Claims but No Evidence Regarding the Details of Effectiveness -- Lessons or Air Force Propaganda -- CLUSTER BOMBS AND MINES -- COALITION/NATO TECHNOLOGY AND INTEROPERABILITY -- European Problems and Weaknesses -- European Views on the Lessons for Force Upgrades and Interoperability -- Secretary Cohen's Summary Comments on Interoperability -- NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative -- NATO and European Action or Inaction? -- COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS (C4) -- Key Lessons from the War -- Reiterating the Need for Capability and Interoperability -- Lessons for High Level and Political Decision Makers -- Combined Air Operations Center -- Secure Communications and Operational Security -- Joint Operational Architecture, Network, and Information Management -- CONSCRIPTS VERSUS PROFESSIONALS -- WELL-; TRAINED RESERVES VERSUS A LARGE MOBILIZATION BASE -- CRUISE MISSILES -- Speaking in Glittering Generalities -- Growing Effectiveness? -- DECOYS -- ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE EA-6B -- Over-Reliance on the EA-6B and Insufficient Electronic Warfare Assets -- Lessons Regarding the EA-6B -- Lessons Regarding the Overall Need to Improve US Electronic Warfare Capabilities -- Lessons Regarding NATO and Alliance Electronic Warfare Capabilities -- EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY AND POWER PROJECTION OF US AND NATO FORCES -- Deployment Planning and Management.; The Role of US Strategic Lift.