1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910825573003321

Titolo

Simulation and knowledge of action / / edited by Jerome Dokic and Joelle Proust

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Amsterdam ; ; Philadelphia, PA, : John Benjamins Pub., c2002

ISBN

90-272-9707-X

0-585-46187-2

9786612254925

1-282-25492-8

90-272-5169-X

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

xxi, 269 p

Collana

Advances in consciousness research, , 1381-589X ; ; v. 45

Altri autori (Persone)

DokicJerome <1965->

ProustJoelle

Disciplina

128/.2

Soggetti

Philosophy of mind in children

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Nota di contenuto

Simulation and Knowledge of Action -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Table of contents -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Simulation theory and mental concepts -- Reply to Alvin I. Goldman -- Chapter 2: From simulation to theory -- Reply to Paul Bernier -- Chapter 3: Neurophysiological evidence for simulation of action -- Reply to Jean Decety. Perceiving actions and understanding agency -- Chapter 4: The scope and limits of mental simulation -- Reply to Pierre Jacob -- Chapter 5: Some reasons to link imitation and imitation recognition to theory of mind -- Reply to Jacqueline Nadel -- Chapter 6: Varieties of simulation -- Reply to François Recanati -- Chapter 7: Mental simulation, dialogical processing and the syndrome of autism -- Reply to Donald M. Peterson -- Chapter 8: Can "radical" simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? -- Reply to Joëlle Proust -- Chapter 9: Joint attention and simulation -- Reply to John Campbell -- Subject index -- Name index -- In the series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH (AiCR).

Sommario/riassunto

The current debate between theory theory and simulation theory on the nature of mentalisation has reached no consensus yet, although many



now think that some hybrid theory is needed. This collection of essays represents an effort at re-evaluating the scope of simulation theory, while also considering areas in which it could be submitted to experimental tests. The volume explores the two main versions of simulation theory, Goldman's introspectionism and Gordon's radical simulationism, and enquires whether they allow a non-circular account of mentalisation. The originality of the volume is to confront conceptual views on simulation with data from pragmatics, developmental psychology and the neurosciences. Individual chapters contain discussions of specific issues such as autism, imitation, motor imagery, conditional reasoning, joint attention and the understanding of demonstratives. It will be of interest primarily to advanced students and researchers in the philosophy of mind, language and action, but also to everyone interested in the nature of interpretation and communication. (Series B).