1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910824680903321

Autore

Gillett Grant <1950->

Titolo

Consciousness and intentionality / / Grant R. Gillett, John McMillan

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Amsterdam ; ; Philadelphia, PA, : J. Benjamins Pub., c2001

ISBN

1-282-16394-9

9786612163944

90-272-9987-0

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (275 pages)

Collana

Advances in consciousness research, , 1381-589X ; ; v. 27

Altri autori (Persone)

McMillanJohn

Disciplina

126

Soggetti

Consciousness

Intentionality (Philosophy)

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. [255]-260) and index.

Nota di contenuto

CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Contents -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Consciousness and intentionality Foundations -- Chapter 2. Language and Consciousness -- Chapter 3. The objects of consciousness -- Chapter 4. Consciousness and action -- Chapter 5. Consciousness and society -- Chapter 6. Consciousness and the brain -- Chapter 7. Animal Consciousness -- Chapter 8. Anomalies of consciousness -- Consciousness and intentionality Some conclusions -- Glossary -- References -- Index -- the series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH.

Sommario/riassunto

Is there an internal relationship between consciousness and intentionality? Can mental content be described in such a way so as to avoid dualism? What is the influence of social context upon consciousness, conceptions of self and mental content?This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major tenets. Focusing upon the rule governed nature of concepts and the grounding of the rules for concept use in the practical world, intentional consciousness emerges as a phenomena that depends upon social context. Given that dependence, the authors consider and set aside attempts to reduce human consciousness and intentionality to



phenomena explicable at biological or neuroscientific levels. (Series A).