1.

Record Nr.

UNIORUON00422241

Titolo

Explorations

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Paris, : Fata Morgana

Lingua di pubblicazione

Non definito

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Collezione

2.

Record Nr.

UNIORUON00440442

Autore

AUTRET, Jean

Titolo

Ruskin and the French : before Marcel Proust : with the collected fragmentary translations / Jean Autret

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Genève, : Librairie Droz, 1965

Descrizione fisica

130 p. ; 25 cm.

Soggetti

RUSKIN JOHN

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Francese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia



3.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910824068303321

Autore

Taliaferro Jeffrey W.

Titolo

Balancing risks : great power intervention in th periphery / / Jeffrey W. Taliaferro

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Ithaca, New York ; ; London : , : Cornell University Press, , [2004]

©2004

ISBN

1-5017-2025-2

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (329 pages)

Collana

Cornell studies in security affairs

Classificazione

15.59

89.79

Disciplina

909.82

Soggetti

World politics - 20th century

Great Britain Foreign relations 1901-1910

Japan Foreign relations 1912-1945

United States Foreign relations 1945-1953

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Includes index.

Nota di contenuto

Front matter -- CONTENTS -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Note on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions -- 1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk -- 2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery -- 3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis -- 4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions -- 5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) -- 6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery -- 7. Implications of the Argument -- Notes -- Index

Sommario/riassunto

Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts? Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns



about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism. Taliaferro constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the U.S. in 1940-41.