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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910823570803321 |
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Autore |
Bogetoft Peter |
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Titolo |
Design of production contracts [[electronic resource] ] : lessons from theory and agriculture / / by Peter Bogetoft and Henrik Ballebye Olesen |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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[Copenhagen?] ; ; Herndon, VA, : Copenhagen Business School Press, 2004 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1. ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (208 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Contracts |
Contracts, Agricultural |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Design of Production Contracts: Lessons from Theory and Agriculture -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1.1 The Theory of Contracting -- 1.2 The Practice of Contracting -- 1.3 Combining Theory and Practice -- 1.4 The Research Project -- 1.5 Readers Guide -- 1.6 Homepage -- 1.7 References -- Ten Rules of Thumb in Contract Design -- 2.1 Introduction1 -- 2.2 Contract Design -- 2.3 The Contracts -- 2.4 Ten Rules of Thumb -- 2.4.1 Coordinate production -- Examples -- 2.4.2 Balance the pros and cons of decentralization -- Examples -- 2.4.3 Minimize the costs of risk and uncertainty -- Examples -- 2.4.4 Reduce the costs of post-contractual opportunism -- Examples -- 2.4.5 Reduce the costs of pre-contractual opportunism -- Examples -- 2.4.6 Do not kill cooperation -- Examples -- 2.4.7 Motivate long-term concerns -- Examples -- 2.4.8 Balance pros and cons of renegotiation -- Examples -- 2.4.9 Reduce the direct costs of contracting -- Examples -- 2.4.10 Use transparent contracts -- Examples -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 2.6 References -- Contract Theory: A Holistic Approach -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Overall Goal -- 3.3 Three Main Objectives -- 3.4 Coordination -- 3.4.1 Coordination of production -- 3.4.2 Coordination of risk -- Risk sharing -- Minimizing risk -- 3.5 Motivation -- 3.5.1 Participation -- 3.5.2 Effort -- The informativeness principle -- Incentive intensity -- Multi-tasking -- Multiple producers -- Robustness -- 3.5.3 Investment -- 3.6 Transaction Costs -- 3.6.1 |
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