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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910822006903321 |
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Titolo |
The economics of conflict : theory and empirical evidence / / edited by Karl Wärneryd |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cambridge, Massachusetts ; ; London, England : , : MIT Press, , 2014 |
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©2014 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (305 p.) |
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Collana |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Insurgency - Economic aspects |
War - Economic aspects |
Economic development - Political aspects |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; Series Foreword; Preface; Introduction; 1 Strategic Aspects of Fighting in Alliances; 2 Fiscal Equalization and Political Conflict; 3 Natural Resources, Social Conflict, and Poverty Trap; 4 A Game of Thrones: Power Structure and the Stability of Regimes; 5 The Probability of Military Rule in Africa, 1970 to 2007; 6 Sociopolitical Conflict and Economic Performance in Bolivia; 7 Occupational Choices and Insurgency in Afghanistan's Provinces; 8 Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs |
9 Social Preferences of Ex-Combatants: Survey and Experimental Evidence from Postwar TajikistanContributors; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Modern economics has largely ignored the issue of outright conflict as an alternative way of allocating goods, assuming instead the existence of well-defined property rights enforced by an undefined third party. And yet even in ostensibly peaceful market transactions, conflict exists as an outside option, sometimes constraining the outcomes reached through voluntary agreement. In this volume, economists offer a crucial rational-choice perspective on conflict, using methodological approaches that range from the game theoretic to the experimental. |
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